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INTRODUCTION
An announcement on June 18, 2009, by global mining company Rio 
Tinto sent a powerful message to law firms that the world is changing.  The 
company declared that it had entered into an agreement with legal process 
outsourcing (LPO) company CPA Global to perform legal work on a scale 
that would reduce Rio Tinto’s annual legal expenses by an estimated twenty 
percent, or tens of millions of dollars.1  This work currently was being done 
by lawyers in the company’s legal department.  Traditionally, if a 
company’s inside lawyers did not handle legal work, the company engaged 
an outside law firm to do much of it.  Rio Tinto’s managing attorney, Leah 
Cooper, however, explained that the company no longer wanted to pursue 
that option:  “For a long time,” she said, “we’ve been asking law firms to 
provide us with ways to better control and predict our costs, but at best they 
offered a discount or a cap in fees . . . .  In the end, we decided to take the 
initiative ourselves.”2
A team of CPA lawyers in India will be dedicated to working for Rio 
Tinto, and Cooper has said that she wants them to function as does any 
other Rio Tinto office.3  At the time of the announcement, CPA had already 
completed forty projects for the company, including contract review, legal 
research and analysis, merger and acquisition due diligence work, and draft 
joint venture agreements, as well as gathering fifty lawyers within forty-
eight hours in Washington D.C. to handle an electronic discovery request 
from the Federal Trade Commission.4  The majority of the work that the 
LPO will be performing is relatively routine, but Rio Tinto stresses that 
most of it “is not volume-based; it’s day-to-day work that requires constant 
communication.”5  Furthermore, the mining company wants CPA lawyers 
to take on more sophisticated and strategic work.6
Rio Tinto’s announcement occurred in the midst of an economic 
recession, but the forces that led to it were in place well before the 
downturn.  Corporate clients in recent years increasingly have insisted that 
law firms provide legal services more efficiently.  Inside counsel have the 
responsibility to meet a budget just like any other corporate department.  
They are asked to be increasingly productive—often to do more on a 
smaller budget.  This requires that they minimize their companies’ spending 
on legal services and be able to predict for corporate managers what those 
expenses will be.  Since spending on outside law firms is the lion’s share of 
most corporate legal department budgets, counsel are putting pressure on 
1. Breaking New Ground, LEGAL STRATEGY REV., Summer 2009, at 13, 15.  The 
company estimates that using CPA Global will result in cost savings of 3:1 for work that 
would have been done in house and 7:1 for work that would have been sent to outside law 
firms. Id. at 14. 
2. Id. at 13. 
3. Id. at 14. 
4. Id.
5. Id. at 15.
6. Id.
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firms to deliver better services at lower cost.  Some are entering into 
variations of fixed fee arrangements, under which a firm will agree to 
handle a particular matter within a certain budget, with the possibility of 
adjustments depending on the outcome.  In this and other ways, corporate 
clients are asking firms to share more of the legal risk, and to consider how 
they can be more innovative and cost effective in providing representation. 
Rio Tinto’s contract with CPA Global represents an initiative in which 
inside counsel is attempting to manage legal costs by expanding 
competition for corporate legal work beyond law firms.  CPA Global will 
be doing millions of dollars worth of work that law firm associates 
otherwise would be doing.  Rio Tinto’s standard for using CPA lawyers 
poses a direct threat to firms:  “If you had a junior associate sitting next to 
you, would you hand the assignment to that junior associate?  If the answer 
is ‘yes,’ it can probably go to India.”7  At present, this work is mainly 
routine, but law firms can make considerable profits by having associates 
perform it.  In addition, much of it traditionally has provided opportunities 
for young law firm lawyers to gain experience and training.  The 
competitive threat to law firms does not end there, however.  Rio Tinto is 
not satisfied with limiting CPA Global to routine work; it wants the LPO 
increasingly to assume responsibility for more complex matters.  As CPA 
does so, this will mean even less business for outside law firms.  Rio Tinto 
stresses that it will still hire law firms for their “strategic expertise.”8  As 
time goes on, and LPOs gain more sophisticated expertise, however, that 
may begin to encompass a smaller and smaller portion of work, which 
could spell trouble for many of today’s large law firms. 
To compete in this world, law firms will have to begin considering how 
they might engage in the same disaggregation process as their clients.  That 
is, they will need to break work down into discrete units and determine who 
is the most cost-efficient provider of each component.  In some cases, that 
provider may be outside the firm, and the firm will need to engage in 
outsourcing.  Law firms thus might increasingly face the same decision that 
their corporate clients regularly confront:  whether to produce all the goods 
or services they need inside the firm or contract to obtain them from third 
parties in the market. 
If the legal services market so develops, that sector of the economy 
would come to mimic the way that production is organized in many other 
industries.  Corporate outsourcing of legal work is an example of what 
many organizations—including law firms—have been doing for many 
years:  outsourcing administrative and support services.  Outside vendors 
now assume responsibility for human resources, accounting, and 
information technology functions for many economic enterprises.  These 
are all activities that assist an organization in conducting its basic line of 
 7. Interview by Richard Susskind with Leah Cooper, Managing Attorney, Rio Tinto 
(Oct. 9, 2009), http://www.legalweek.com/legal-week/analysis/1556450/legal-process-
outsourcing-richard-susskind-leah-cooper. 
8. Breaking New Ground, supra note 1, at 15. 
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business, whether manufacturing automobiles or providing telecommunications 
service.  For corporations, legal services also constitute a support function 
that helps a company pursue its mission.9  Rio Tinto’s business is not 
providing legal services, but mining, and the law department helps it 
conduct this business effectively. 
For law firms, however, providing legal services is their business.  In 
economic terms, having a portion of that work done by people outside the 
firm constitutes outsourcing parts of its production operations to third 
parties.  Widespread adoption of this practice by law firms therefore would 
correspond to corporations’ increasing tendency to divide up the process of 
producing goods and services into discrete components and contracting 
with suppliers to provide them.  As Walter Powell has observed, “the 
growing reliance of established firms in all industries on outside parties for 
nearly every stage in the research, design, and production process has 
become very strong.”10
Examples from manufacturing and service industries illustrate how far 
this trend has progressed.  In aerospace manufacturing, companies have 
begun to outsource responsibility not only for producing discrete parts of an 
aircraft but for more complex and knowledge-intensive activities, such as 
conceptualization and design.11  Boeing, for example, outsourced the design 
of wings for 7E7 aircraft to a Japanese company and production of parts of 
the fuselage to an Italian company.12  It gave “total production competence” 
to those companies; they were responsible for that entire section of the 
aircraft from conceptualization to production.13  This design and production 
task is technologically complex and requires substantial knowledge on the 
part of the outside companies.  Outsourcing such functions, however, has 
significantly reduced costs in this industry.14  Companies have enjoyed 
these savings despite significant costs associated with moving technology 
and production capacity to a new location.  The aerospace industry was 
long regarded as a highly specialized industry that produced goods that had 
to be assembled in a specific way in a single location.  As more producers 
realize that they can segment the production process, they have increasingly 
9. See Mari Sako, Global Strategies in the Legal Services Marketplace:  Institutional 
Impacts on Value Chain Dynamics 3 (July 2009) (unpublished article, on file with the 
Fordham Law Review). 
 10. Walter W. Powell, The Capitalist Firm in the Twenty-First Century:  Emerging 
Patterns in Western Enterprise, in THE TWENTY-FIRST-CENTURY FIRM: CHANGING 
ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION IN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 33, 65 (Paul DiMaggio ed., 2001) 
[hereinafter THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY FIRM]. 
 11. David Pritchard & Alan MacPherson, Outsourcing US Commercial Aircraft 
Technology and Innovation:  Implications for the Industry’s Long Term Design and Build 
Capability 1, 1–3 (Can.-U.S. Trade Ctr., Occasional Paper No. 29, 2004). 
12. Id. at 3. 
13. Id.
 14. G. R. Hall & R. E. Johnson, Transfers of United States Aerospace Technology to 
Japan, in THE TECHNOLOGY FACTOR IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE 305, 354 (Raymond Vernon 
ed., 1970); Scott E. Masten, The Organization of Production:  Evidence from the Aerospace 
Industry, 27 J.L. & ECON. 403, 411–13 (1984). 
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reaped the substantial cost savings that can come from outsourcing 
production to third parties that make up a company’s supply chain. 
Outsourcing also has progressed significantly in healthcare services in 
recent years—an industry that is similar to legal services in its demand for 
advanced training and complex judgment, and in the traditional belief that 
providing service in person is essential.15  Advances in information and 
communications technology have spurred this development.  Medical 
services such as interpreting CAT scans and MRIs, writing radiology 
reports, transcribing medical notes, and remote diagnosis are now common, 
with much of the work performed overseas.16  For instance, when medical 
providers are stretched thin, especially during the nighttime hours in the 
United States, qualified physicians in India are able to review their 
diagnoses and provide additional assurance that they are accurate.  In areas 
where medical services cannot be provided on a consistent basis, physicians 
in other states and countries can step in remotely and provide immediate 
medical advice.  Furthermore, some rural hospitals now rely on remote 
electronic Intensive Care Unit (ICU) providers, who “simultaneously 
monitor ICU patients in several hospitals from a central location.”17  The 
providers use video surveillance and real-time data feeds to consult with 
and advise nurses at the bedside.18
The American Telemedicine Association (ATA) reports that, while 
radiology makes the greatest use of remote services, other specialties 
including dermatology, ophthalmology, mental health, cardiology, and 
pathology do as well.19  The ATA estimates that over fifty subspecialties 
have used telemedicine, which it defines as “the use of medical information 
exchanged from one site to another via electronic communications.”20  A 
hospital or group of physicians thus is increasingly likely to deliver medical 
services by contracting with a network of specialized providers who may be 
located anywhere in the world. 
As a result, a growing number of companies are producing goods and 
services by relying on supply chains that extend beyond the formal 
boundaries of the organization.  This article examines the prospect that law 
firms will move in this direction and the implications for the organization of 
15. See William K. Foxx, Michele D. Bunn & Valarie McCay, Outsourcing Services in 
the Healthcare Sector, 9 J. MED. MARKETING 41, 41–43 (2009). See generally Sangiv N. 
Singh & Robert M. Wachter, Perspectives on Medical Outsourcing and Telemedicine—
Rough Edges in a Flat World?, 358 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1622 (2008); Robert M. Wachter, The
“Dis-location” of U.S. Medicine—The Implications of Medical Outsourcing, 354 NEW ENG.
J. MED. 661 (2006); Gretchen Henkel, X-Ray Has Left the Building, HOSPITALIST, Dec. 2006, 
http://www.the-hospitalist.org/details/article/196171/XRay_Has_Left_the_Building.html. 
16. See Amar Gupta et al., Outsourcing in the Healthcare Industry:  Information 
Technology, Intellectual Property, and Allied Aspects, INFO. RESOURCES MGMT. J., Jan.–
Mar. 2008, at 1, 1–3. 
 17. Henkel, supra note 15. 
18. Id.
 19. Telemedicine Defined—American Telemedicine Association, http://www.american
telemed.org/i4a/pages/index.cfm?pageid=3333 (last visited Feb. 27, 2010). 
20. Id.
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legal services and legal careers if they did.  It does so, first, by analyzing 
scholarship on what has been called the “make or buy” decision, and then 
by examining research on the various ways that extending production 
beyond a firm’s boundaries can affect an organization and its employees. 
Much of our analysis necessarily will be tentative.  There has been no 
sustained theoretical or empirical work on the disaggregation of law firm 
services or the use of outsourcing to help provide them.  We suggest that 
scholarship on other business organizations may provide at least a 
preliminary framework for thinking about these issues, but that framework 
inevitably will need to be revised to take account of the distinctive features 
of law firms and legal services.  As a result, this article likely will raise at 
least as many questions as it answers.  We hope, however, that they are 
questions that lead to a deeper understanding of the forces shaping law firm 
practice at the beginning of the twenty-first century. 
I. DISAGGREGATION AND ECONOMIC THEORY
A. The Make or Buy Decision
Ronald Coase was among the first to explore the logic of market 
organizations.  In The Nature of the Firm, Coase asks why the market is 
organized into large firms rather than as individual entrepreneurs working 
as independent contractors.21  The prevailing theory in Coase’s time was 
that the market is always the most efficient method of production and that 
outsourcing theoretically will always be the most efficient option.  Coase, 
however, suggested that firms exist because individuals cannot effectively 
manage production by themselves.  He noted that there are substantial costs 
associated with using the market, which are associated with contracting, 
controlling risk, and delivering a product.22  For many of the goods that 
Coase studied, the cost of labor and delivery connected with the end 
product was greater than the cost of the capital inputs that went into 
production.23  As a result, individual entrepreneurs arranged themselves 
into larger collectives in order to deal more efficiently with, and spread the 
costs of, the production process.24
This analysis led Coase to establish guidelines for firms in assessing 
whether to make a product or provide a service within the firm or to obtain 
it from an outside supplier.  These guidelines suggest that a firm will 
choose to produce more goods internally when the costs of doing so are not 
outweighed by the potential benefits of sending production outside the 
firm.25  In order to calculate the costs and benefits of each alternative, 
Coase developed three criteria for firms to analyze:  the costs of organizing 
21. See generally R. H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937). 
22. Id. at 388. 
23. See id. at 389. 
24. Id.; see also George S. Geis, Business Outsourcing and the Agency Cost Problem, 82 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 955, 968 (2007). 
 25. Coase, supra note 21, at 394. 
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production, the likelihood of mistakes, and the marginal benefit of 
increasing production.26  Firms should be structured so as to attain an 
optimal balance between production inside and outside of the firm.  The 
growth of those that fail to strike this balance will be constrained.  Firms 
thus represent a delicate balance of costs and benefits, which are influenced 
by the size of the firm and the nature of its production.27  Coase focuses 
much of his attention on the process by which a firm can determine the 
optimal point between internal production and outsourcing of goods and 
services. 
Coase’s theories, known collectively as relating to the “make or buy” 
decision, have become pervasive in modern economic and business 
analysis.28  Scholars since Coase have identified various other industries in 
which the concept of the make or buy decision is applicable and have built 
upon the framework of the original theory.29
In expanding upon and refining Coase’s work, Oliver Williamson arrived 
at the conclusion that nearly all decisions in the firm are, or ought to be, 
determined by the relative costs of internally producing or transacting for 
the production of goods.30  He theorized that this calculation should dictate 
whether firms integrate their production completely internally—that is, are 
vertically integrated—or send all or part of their production outside the 
firm—in other words, are vertically disintegrated.  To use Williamson’s 
terms, firms can rely either on hierarchies or markets to organize 
production.31
Key considerations in the make or buy decision include the extent to 
which a firm can decompose its production process, determine which assets 
are firm specific, and address risks associated with uncertainty.  First, firms 
must be able to separate their activities into relatively discrete components 
or stages whose production can be assigned to the most cost-efficient 
providers.  In manufacturing, such decomposition is of course common, 
since the production process involves the use of distinct items that can be 
separately created and then assembled in sequences that culminate in a 
finished product.  In some cases, the components are designed so that there 
is virtually no need for coordination among them.  One portion of an 
26. Id. at 396–97. 
27. See id. at 389. 
28. See generally Oliver E. Williamson, The Vertical Integration of Production:  Market 
Failure Considerations, 61 AM. ECON. REV. 112 (1971); Jeffrey T. Macher & Barak D. 
Richman, Transaction Cost Economics:  An Assessment of Empirical Research in the Social 
Sciences (Duke Law Sch. Legal Studies, Paper No. 115, 2006), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=924192.
29. See generally Paul L. Joskow, Contract Duration and Relationship-Specific 
Investments:  Empirical Evidence from Coal Markets, 77 AM. ECON. REV. 168 (1987); Saul 
Klein, A Transaction Cost Explanation of Vertical Control in International Markets, 17 J.
ACAD. MARKETING SCI. 253 (1989).   
30. See Oliver E. Williamson, The Economics of Organization:  The Transaction Cost 
Approach, 87 AM. J. SOC. 548, 554 (1981). 
31. See generally OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND 
ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS: A STUDY IN THE ECONOMICS OF INTERNAL ORGANIZATION (1975). 
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automobile can be assembled, for instance, and then fitted seamlessly into 
another portion because the two have been designed to fit together.  Even if 
this process occurs within a single organization, theoretically “[e]ach 
module, at the extreme, could become the sole business of a specialist firm, 
which would have complete design authority over the specific module on 
which it focuses.”32  In other instances, there may be more need for 
supervision to ensure that the completed product of one phase of production 
is smoothly handed off in useable form to those responsible for the next 
phase.
In the service sector, decomposition has relied on analysis of work flow, 
or the steps involved in providing a service to an end user.  These steps are 
subdivided into constituent sets of tasks and activities, with an estimate of 
the time and resources required for each.  Each step serves as the equivalent 
of a module that can be performed by one set of actors and handed off to 
others involved in succeeding steps.  Workflow systems may be nested 
within larger projects to handle portions of work that can be standardized.33
A second step in the make or buy decision is to identify which resources 
are especially valuable to a firm’s core activities and crucial to its 
distinctive expertise.34  Assets that fall into this category are said to be high 
in “specificity.”35  Core functions traditionally have been defined as those 
value-creating activities that are crucial to an organization’s competitive 
advantage.36  “The nature of the core activity or function differs from one 
organization to another:  for an automobile manufacturing plant, the core 
activity might be assembling a car; for a school, it is educating students; 
and for a bank, it might be handling financial transactions.”37  Because of 
the risks associated with external production, products high in asset 
specificity generally are produced internally.38  By contrast, products that 
are low in asset specificity are more likely to be acquired from parties in the 
market.39
Williamson identifies four types of asset specificity:  site specificity, 
physical asset specificity, dedicated asset specificity, and human asset 
 32. Stefano Brusoni, The Limits to Specialization:  Problem Solving and Coordination in 
“Modular Networks,” 26 ORG. STUD. 1885, 1886 (2005). 
 33. RICHARD SUSSKIND, THE END OF LAWYERS? RETHINKING THE NATURE OF LEGAL 
SERVICES 137 (2008). 
34. See id. at 169. 
35. See generally Oliver E. Williamson, Transaction-Cost Economics:  The Governance 
of Contractual Relations, 22 J.L. & ECON. 233 (1979). 
36. See, e.g., Ulli Arnold, New Dimensions of Outsourcing:  A Combination of 
Transaction Cost Economics and the Core Competencies Concept, 6 EUR. J. OF PURCHASING
& SUPPLY MGMT. 23, 26 (2000); Charles B. Stabell & Oystein D. Fjeldstad, Configuring 
Value for Competitive Advantage:  On Chains, Shops, and Networks, 19 STRATEGIC MGMT.
J. 413, 413 (1998).  On the concept of competitive advantage, see generally MICHAEL E.
PORTER, COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE (1985). 
 37. Torstein Nesheim, Karen M. Olsen & Arne L. Kalleberg, Externalizing the Core:  
Firms’ Use of Employment Intermediaries in the Information and Communication 
Technology Industries, 46 HUM. RESOURCE MGMT. 247, 249 (2007). 
38. Id.
39. Id.
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specificity.40  Most relevant to our discussion are physical asset specificity, 
dedicated asset specificity, and human asset specificity.41  Physical asset 
specificity exists when a party makes an investment in particular 
infrastructure that would have a lower value in other transactions.42  Firms 
that invest in information technology infrastructure, for example, are 
making investments in physically specific assets.  Dedicated assets are 
investments made in anticipation of a specific contract.  Human asset 
specificity is perhaps the most important for firms in the service industry.43
Such assets represent investments in a labor pool whose skills are used in 
the firm’s production process. 
Paul Joskow has focused on the influence of asset specificity on the make 
or buy decision in his empirical work on transaction cost theory.  His 
analysis of investments in infrastructure for the mining, production, and use 
of coal has led him to conclude that asset specificity is one of the most 
significant factors in explaining the extent to which firms internalize or 
externalize production.44  Specifically, Joskow has found that when an asset 
is of high value to the firm, the firm is likely to keep production of it inside 
or engage in long-term contracting to reduce risks associated with acquiring 
the asset from an outside producer.45
Joskow’s findings are drawn from studies of coal power plants, coal 
miners, and the contractual relationships that shaped the coal industry 
during the 1980s.  His research examined how power plants that burn coal 
to produce energy can become more efficient by outsourcing coal mining in 
some situations, using spot contracts for coal in others, and mining the coal 
themselves in still other instances.46  Joskow found that within the coal 
industry, power plants engaged in different forms of contracting and 
production in order to secure the coal that they needed for their production 
process.  Power plants were likely either to engage in long-term contracting 
to obtain coal or to locate their power plants at the mouth of coal mines and 
mine the coal themselves when (1) the specific type of coal was extremely 
important to the plant and (2) unique assets had to be deployed in order to 
secure production because of either the rare nature of the coal or the 
intensive nature of extracting it from the ground.47  The relatively specific 
nature of the assets required to obtain rare forms of coal, in other words, 
 40. Joskow, supra note 29, at 170 & n.14. 
 41. Site specificity is a form of asset specificity that reflects location-specific 
investments, which cannot be transferred after the investments are made.  They are 
traditionally assessed when applying transaction cost economics to industries involving 
heavy manufacturing. Id. at 170–71. 
 42. Oliver E. Williamson, Credible Commitments:  Using Hostages To Support 
Exchange, 73 AM. ECON. REV. 519, 523 (1983). 
43. Id. at 526–28. 
44. See Joskow, supra note 29, at 169. 
45. Id. at 180; Paul L. Joskow, Price Adjustment in Long-Term Contracts:  The Case of 
Coal, 31 J.L. & ECON. 47, 53 (1988). 
 46. Paul L. Joskow, Asset Specificity and the Structure of Vertical Relationships:  
Empirical Evidence, 4 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 95, 101 (1988). 
47. See Joskow, supra note 45, at 53. 
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dictated a more secure method of production.48  When coal was relatively 
plentiful and less difficult to extract, however, power plants were more 
likely to secure the supplies necessary for production by engaging in short-
term or spot contracting.49
Aside from his empirical work on transaction cost economics, Joskow 
has refined the theoretical framework that Williamson put forward.  While 
Williamson was the first to define the four types of asset specificity, Joskow 
has provided practical definitions for each type.  He also has emphasized 
that asset specificity is not binary but can vary incrementally.  By locating 
assets on a spectrum between low and high specificity, firms can outsource 
using long-term, near-term, and spot contracting to increase the benefits 
they can obtain from outsourcing.50  While these options may not allow 
firms to realize the full benefits of pure disaggregation, they do allow them 
to mitigate more precisely the risk of outsourcing, especially with respect to 
activities they have identified as being of high value. 
Akbar Zaheer and his colleagues have focused on two other dimensions 
of the types of asset specificity that Williamson defined.51  The first is the 
knowledge and skill that individuals within the firm possess and how 
specific those skills are to the firm’s activities.52  If the human-capital assets 
the firm needs to produce a good are highly specific to the process, a firm 
may be more likely to continue producing that good within the firm.53  The 
second dimension is the nature of the procedures that firms must deploy, 
which has a substantial impact on a firm’s decision to vertically 
disaggregate.54  When a firm has very specific procedures that it must 
develop to produce certain goods, it becomes difficult for the firm to 
contract with third parties to obtain those goods in the market at comparable 
cost and quality.55
A third consideration in the make or buy decision is the risks arising from 
uncertainty associated with production inside or outside of the firm.  These 
risks include the possibility of opportunism and the existence of bounded 
rationality.56  Opportunism occurs when parties act in their own self-interest 
at the expense of others.  Production outside the firm exposes it to the risk 
that the suppliers with which it contracts will exploit the firm’s dependence 
on them to extract benefits beyond those specified in the original 
agreements.  While not everyone acts opportunistically, at least some 
48. See id.
49. See id.
50. See Joskow, supra note 46, at 101. 
 51. Akbar Zaheer & N. Venkatraman, Determinants of Electronic Integration in the 
Insurance Industry:  An Empirical Test, 40 MGMT. SCI. 549, 553 (1994). 
52. Id.
53. See id. at 550, 561. 
54. See id.
 55. Alternatively, a knowledge-based theory of the firm would suggest that the reason 
for integration in this situation is less the cost or difficulty of using the market than the 
particular benefits that will accrue from producing the goods internally. 
56. See generally Williamson, supra note 30, at 552–60. 
2010] SUPPLY CHAINS AND POROUS BOUNDARIES 2147 
people will, and it is impossible to assess who will do so and when.57
Bounded rationality refers to the fact that people lack the ability to process 
all the information available in the market.58  As a consequence, no one is 
able to assess every possible outcome that could result from a decision.  In 
deciding whether to organize production internally or externally, firms must 
assign probabilities to the potential costs and benefits of each alternative.59
The confidence with which it can do so—or, put differently, different levels 
of uncertainty associated with internal and external production—may lead it 
to select one approach over the other. 
Analyzing these considerations can help firms make rational decisions 
about whether to make something internally or outsource production by 
contracting with a supplier for goods or services.60  When uncertainty and 
asset specificity are low, for instance, traditional theory says that firms 
generally should outsource production.61  Sourcing production of various 
inputs to the least-cost provider can enable a firm to lower production costs 
and increase marginal profits on each good or service that it sells.62  In 
addition, a firm can be more flexible in response to changing economic 
conditions, adjusting the scale of its production and the amount of inputs 
that it must use depending on market demand.63  A firm converts what 
would have been a fixed cost into a variable cost, which the firm can choose 
to pay based on the amount of productive capacity it needs at any given 
time.64  Finally, a firm may free up its internal resources for more complex 
work, thereby expanding capacity for higher-value activities.65
When asset specificity is high, there is a risk that outside suppliers may 
act opportunistically because the asset is not sufficiently fungible that it can 
be acquired from a large number of sources in the market.66  This raises the 
potential cost of outsourcing, the risk of which cannot be completely 
57. Id. at 554. 
58. Id. at 553. 
59. See, e.g., Joskow, supra note 29, at 171. 
 60. Gordon Walker & David Weber, A Transaction Cost Approach to Make-or-Buy 
Decisions, 29 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 373, 376 (1984).  An additional consideration that sometimes 
is relevant is frequency of production. See Williamson, supra note 35, at 239.  When a firm 
produces something infrequently, it would not make economic sense for it to incur the cost 
of maintaining a permanent in-house operation to produce it.  The firm thus is more likely to 
acquire the inputs to make it from other parties as needed. See id. at 241; see also Lisa M. 
Ellram et al., Offshore Outsourcing of Professional Services:  A Transaction Cost Economics 
Perspective, 26 J. OPERATIONS MGMT. 148, 150 (2008).  Scholarship in transaction cost 
economics generally devotes little attention to the concept of frequency, since it is the easiest 
aspect for firms to analyze.  While the level of production activity can be plotted on a 
continuum, there often is a readily distinguishable line that identifies when production is 
frequent enough to justify internal production. 
 61. Ellram, supra note 60, at 150. 
62. See id. at 148–50. 
63. See id.; Saul Klein, A Transaction Cost Analysis Model of Channel Integration in 
International Markets, 27 J. MARKETING RES. 196, 200, 205 (1990). 
 64. Klein, supra note 63, at 200, 205. 
 65. Kevin Chern, Legal Process Outsourcing Makes Sense for Busy Consumer 
Bankruptcy Attorneys, 28 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 44, 44–45, 64 (2009). 
66. Id.
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eliminated by contractual provisions.67  Firms therefore may choose to 
produce internally or to engage in long-term contracting with an external 
producer in order to mitigate its risk.  In addition, a knowledge-based 
theory of the firm suggests that asset specificity may make internal 
production especially efficient because it enables the use of firm-specific 
language and routines.68
B. Legal Services
The economic theory of the firm suggests that the ability of law firms to 
decompose their services, determine which assets are firm specific, and 
address the risks associated with uncertainty will shape the future of 
outsourcing in this part of the legal services market. 
1.  Decomposition 
Legal services traditionally have been regarded as relatively “bundled,” 
in the sense that they consist of tightly linked elements that cannot be easily 
separated.  The underlying premise of this assumption is that someone with 
a distinct sense of legal judgment is necessary to understand how the 
various elements of a matter are linked together.  The corollary is that 
persons without this perspective are likely to miss legally significant 
features of information. 
Law firms, however, have been decomposing their work within the firm 
for quite some time.  They delegate responsibility for discrete aspects of a 
case or a transaction to a variety of people, both lawyers and nonlawyers, in 
what we might think of as a supply chain.  A major piece of litigation, for 
instance, involves a complex division of labor that includes preparation of 
and response to discovery requests; review of documents for 
responsiveness, relevance, significance, and privilege; preparation of 
deposition questions and digests of deposition testimony; briefings with 
experts; preparation of motions and pleadings; argument at trial; and 
numerous other tasks.  Large transactions include people working on 
various aspects of due diligence, review of regulatory compliance, 
preparation of a multitude of interconnected documents, negotiation, and 
many other activities.  This work may be divided among paralegals, staff 
attorneys, junior associates, senior associates, income partners, and equity 
partners.
67. See OLIVER HART, FIRMS, CONTRACTS, AND FINANCIAL STRUCTURE 1–14, 73–93 
(1995).  Oliver Hart is associated with what has become known as the “property rights 
theory of the firm,” which posits that firms represent a way to allocate control over assets, 
which serves to establish background entitlements for the purpose of negotiating inevitably 
incomplete contracts.  He suggests that this theory shares with transaction cost analysis a 
concern with contractual incompleteness but that a property rights approach places more 
emphasis on “the idea that power is important [and] that institutional agents are designed to 
allocate power among agents.” Id. at 5 (footnote omitted). 
68. See Kirk Monteverde, Technical Dialog as an Incentive for Vertical Integration in 
the Semiconductor Industry, 41 MGMT. SCI. 1624, 1629 (1995). 
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Ideally, this division of labor reflects an effort to direct work to the least 
costly person who can perform it and to maximize use of the distinct set of 
skills that each person can deploy.  Furthermore, the allocation of 
responsibility has shifted over time, as junior partners now do what senior 
partners used to, senior associates do work formerly done by junior 
partners, junior associates complete the tasks that used to be done by senior 
associates, paralegals take on responsibilities formerly borne by junior 
associates, and technology substitutes for some tasks paralegals used to do.  
Law firms also increasingly have begun to use contract lawyers as part of 
these teams.69  They have looked, in other words, to workers outside the 
firm so that they can use even lower-cost personnel to perform services, 
both to reduce costs to clients and to avoid high fixed overhead in the face 
of fluctuating demand.70
 In addition, as the Financial Times observes, “Across the range of 
initiatives implemented by law firms, there are signs of increased 
standardisation of the legal process.  In particular, law firms are 
harnessing technology to a greater degree to streamline services or offer 
analysis that would previously have been impossible.”71
Linklaters’s Blue Flag service, for instance, provides information for 
financial institutions on regulatory provisions around the globe.  As the 
website for this service states, “[i]nformation is structured according to the 
types of financial institution, how you are regulated, where you do business, 
and the nature of your business.  There is no more wading through statutes 
and rules and regulations to find what’s relevant or who to contact.”72
Thus, for instance, an offshore broker may be interested in selling shares in 
an offshore company to investors in Hong Kong.  Issues that might arise 
could include whether the broker needs to be licensed in Hong Kong to 
engage in this transaction, whether it will be treated as a public offering or 
can be accomplished through a private placement, and what the answer 
 69. “In recent years, we have seen a dramatic increase in the number of ‘contract 
lawyers’ used in firms (i.e., lawyers hired for a particular project or set of projects without 
expectation of permanent employment) and that trend seems certain to continue.” 
HILDEBRANDT & CITI PRIVATE BANK, CLIENT ADVISORY: JANUARY 2009, at 15–16 (2009); 
see also Olivia Clarke, Lawyers Fill Temporary Need for Firms, Companies, CHI. LAW.,
Aug. 2007, at 52; Melanie Healy, Rise of the Contract Fillers, LAWYER, Feb. 20, 2006, 
http://www.thelawyer.com/rise-of-the-contract-fillers/118935.article.
 70. Firms also have sought to avoid the risk of incurring excessive fixed costs when 
demand is irregular by handling large projects through syndication rather than internal 
growth. See generally Randall S. Thomas, Stewart J. Schwab & Robert G. Hansen, 
Megafirms, 80 N.C. L. REV. 115 (2001). 
 71. Bob Sherwood, Heads Together, in FINANCIAL TIMES SPECIAL REPORT: FT
INNOVATIVE LAWYERS (2009), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/57191ae4-bc49-11de-9426-
00144feab49a,dwp_uuid=ec1082a4-08a3-11de-b8b0-0000779fd2ac.html?nclick_check=1; 
see, e.g., Nick Holmes, Online Legal Services—What the Big Firms Are Doing, INTERNET 
NEWSL. FOR LAW. (Delia Venables, Lewes, U.K.), Jan./Feb. 2006, 
http://www.venables.co.uk/n0601bigfirms.htm. 
 72. Linklaters Blue Flag, Online Legal Services from Linklaters:  Regulatory, 
http://www.linklaters.com/OnlineServices/Pages/Regulatory.aspx (last visited Feb. 27, 
2010).
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might be to these questions if the broker wants to sell shares in other 
countries.
Linklaters also uses the DealBuilder automated document assembly 
program for its Term Sheet Generator service, which helps bankers produce 
term sheets by providing interactive guidance on structuring financial 
transactions tailored to the needs and wishes of the parties.  This service 
“enables bankers to create term sheets automatically at their desktops—with 
thousands of possible combinations—by completing a simple 
questionnaire.”73  Wilson Sonsini also has an online venture financing term 
sheet that is based upon users’ responses to a questionnaire.74  Eversheds’s 
HR Contract Builder provides similar assistance to human resource 
professionals by automating the process of drafting employment 
documents.75  Allen & Overy uses HotDocs to produce tailored legal 
documents assembled from thousands of clause combinations, working 
through a set of interview questions.76  On the Mexican Wave service 
project, Lovells took responsibility for complex high-end work, while 
outsourcing more routine activities to a “group of smaller law firms that 
were supported by various online tools.”77  These and other initiatives 
suggest that law firms are able to decompose certain portions of the legal 
advice process and produce them at relatively low cost. 
The activities of law firms themselves thus suggest that it is possible to 
decompose legal services to a certain extent.  The emergence of LPOs in 
recent years provides further evidence that such decomposition is feasible.  
Consider, for instance, the range of different activities in which CPA Global 
engages.78  It includes preparing summonses and complaints, interrogatories 
and requests for production of documents, motions, witness kits, timelines 
of events and exhibits, deposition summaries in various formats, 
memoranda of law, legal briefs, letters to third parties presenting a legal 
position, multijurisdictional surveys of laws, and annotated summaries of 
cases.79  Its document review and management services include analysis 
and identification of documents for due diligence purposes, materiality in 
litigation, and privilege in response to discovery requests.80  Contract 
 73. Linklaters, Term Sheet Generator, http://www.linklaters.com/OnlineServices/Pages/
TermSheet.aspx (last visited Feb. 27, 2010). 
74. See Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati, Term Sheet Generator, 
http://www.wsgr.com/wsgr/Display.aspx?SectionName=practice/termsheet.htm (last visited 
Feb. 27, 2010). 
 75. Eversheds, HR Contract Builder Demonstration, http://www.eversheds.com/
hrcontractdemo (last visited Feb. 27, 2010). 
 76. Holmes, supra note 71; see Allen & Overy, Online Services:  NewChange 
Documents, http://www.allenovery.com/AOWEB/OnlineServices/OnlineService.aspx?
contentTypeID=8&itemID=21926&prefLangID=410 (last visited Feb. 27, 2010). 
 77. SUSSKIND, supra note 33, at 46. 
78. See CPA Global, Legal Process Outsourcing (LPO), http://www.cpaglobal.com/
legal_process_outsourcing (last visited Feb. 27, 2010). 
 79. CPA Global, Preparation of Litigation Documents, http://www.cpaglobal.com/
legal_process_outsourcing/litigation_documents (last visited Feb. 27, 2010). 
 80. CPA Global, Document Review, http://www.cpaglobal.com/legal_process_
outsourcing/document_review (last visited Feb. 28, 2010). 
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management includes drafting, revising, summarizing, and analyzing 
contracts.81
Pangea3, another major LPO, performs a similar range of tasks, which 
includes merger and acquisition due diligence reports on companies’ 
potential or existing liabilities; drafting contracts such as nondisclosure 
agreements, vendor contracts, supply agreements, software license 
agreements, telecommunications service agreements, office leases, and 
internet, advertising, and media agreements; and litigation document 
organization and review.82  These readily divisible tasks are well suited for 
realizing the costs and benefits traditionally associated with transaction cost 
economics theory.  They tend to be low in asset specificity in that they are 
generic functions that can be performed by a variety of law firms and other 
legal service providers and require only minimal firm-specific knowledge. 
Nonetheless, decomposition is not a mechanical exercise.  Identifying 
discrete components and the ways in which they relate to one another 
requires first that someone define the desired outputs or objectives of the 
activity in question.  “Problems can be framed in different ways, thus 
generating different patterns of decomposition.  Conceptual design 
activities are aimed chiefly at framing the problem in a specific way and, in 
so doing, identifying the most relevant interdependencies, to isolate them 
and explore alternative decomposition patterns.”83  Decomposition 
therefore requires both analysis—in-depth knowledge of specific process 
steps and operations—and synthesis—a higher-level understanding of the 
process as a whole. 
This is true even in manufacturing, which might seem an activity in 
which decomposition is relatively straightforward.  Stefano Brusoni, for 
instance, describes the ways in which a project to design and engineer a 
chemical plant requires choices that define a particular sequence of 
chemical and physical transformations in order to produce certain chemical 
compounds.84  In the services sector, a company designing a system to 
respond to customer telephone inquiries will construct several different 
work-flow paths based on judgments about the type of problem the 
customer is having, its source, and the party or activity most likely to be 
able to address it.
Organizations also must build in the flexibility to deal with 
contingencies, by identifying specific steps that must be followed upon the 
occurrence of particular events or delegating authority to individuals to 
determine appropriate courses of action.  In some cases, information gained 
in carrying out various steps may lead to a revised definition of a problem 
 81. CPA Global, Contract Management, http://www.cpaglobal.com/legal_process_
outsourcing/contract_management (last visited Feb. 28, 2010). 
82. See Pangea3, Legal Outsourcing Services, http://www.pangea3.com/legal-
outsourcing-services.html (last visited Feb. 27, 2010). 
 83. Brusoni, supra note 32, at 1894. 
84. Id. at 1889–901. 
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or a set of objectives, which may in turn require a different decomposition 
of tasks and activities. 
Decomposition in manufacturing and service companies thus must 
include the capability to redefine outputs or objectives on the basis of 
information gained in the production process.  On average, however, such 
companies may need to engage in this redefinition less often than providers 
of legal services.  In manufacturing, for instance, the objective is to create a 
certain product.  That objective will remain stable, even as unexpected 
developments in production may require revising the means by which it is 
accomplished.  More ambitiously, a company may change and improve the 
features of a product on the basis of knowledge gained in the production 
process.  Toyota, for instance, pioneered the organization of production as a 
learning system that is designed continuously to provide information that 
can be used in future product design.85  Changes in product design may 
then require decomposing production activity in new ways.  Nonetheless, 
the objective of the process is concrete and relatively stable:  to produce an 
automobile. 
Similarly, the objective of a service company is to provide a relatively 
specific service to customers.  A company involved in physical therapy, for 
instance, aims to help patients’ injuries heal and to provide guidance on 
how to prevent future injuries.  As new information from medical research 
becomes available, the company may decompose the therapeutic process in 
different ways.  Nonetheless, despite the wide range of purposes for which 
people may use the Internet and the emergence of new ways to do so, an 
Internet service provider has the consistent goal of providing rapid and 
convenient access to the Web.  Things admittedly become more 
complicated for other service providers whose customers may have more 
idiosyncratic objectives.  Financial planners, for instance, must take into 
account a variety of client objectives in tailoring their services.  Perhaps 
most of these can be evaluated according to the common metric of financial 
welfare, but not necessarily all of them. 
This suggests that, rather than constituting a distinct category, legal 
services are at one end of a continuum of service providers.  Clients come 
to lawyers with needs or problems that have a legal dimension.  Good 
lawyers recognize, however, that legal questions are only part of a larger, 
more complex situation that the lawyer must appreciate in order to serve the 
client well.  There is no established menu of outcomes with standard 
production processes that can be used to govern the provision of service.  
Instead, the lawyer is actively involved in defining the situation that the 
client faces and, along with the client, determining the objectives of the 
representation.  This in turn leads to a distinctive decomposition of the 
85. See generally JEFFREY K. LIKER, THE TOYOTA WAY: 14 MANAGEMENT PRINCIPLES 
FROM THE WORLD’S GREATEST MANUFACTURER 85–168, 221–66 (2004).  This system, 
however, apparently failed to prevent recent dangerous defects in Toyota accelerators. See
Micheline Maynard, An Apology, and Sympathy, from Toyota's Leader, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25, 
2010, at B1. 
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“production process” into specific activities that are connected in particular 
ways.  “Inputs,” in other words, are not preexisting components that the 
lawyer selects, but are dependent on the definition of “outputs”—which are 
defined in different ways for different matters. 
This fluidity of objectives and inputs continues throughout a 
representation as new information comes to light or client preferences 
evolve.  Testimony at a deposition, for instance, may prompt a new line of 
argument or a new theory of a case that causes a subtle revision of 
objectives.  This revision then may prompt redesign of the document review 
and legal research components of the production process.  Paralegals may 
enter new search terms to identify material relevant to the line of inquiry 
that deposition testimony opened up, while junior lawyers may need to 
conduct research on an area of the law that previously was not regarded as 
relevant until the testimony.  The original decomposition of activities did 
not include these particular tasks.  It did, however, establish document 
review and legal research as discrete components of the representation, thus 
creating a flexible production process that was capable of responding to 
new information as the representation proceeded. 
Legal services thus may not be radically different from all other services, 
but providing them is an activity in which continuing flexibility in defining 
“outputs” is an especially significant dimension of the production process.  
In decomposing legal services into discrete components, lawyers therefore 
will need to ensure that there is ongoing communication and coordination 
between strategists and persons performing more discrete tasks.  Strategists 
will need to establish a division of labor or problem-solving architecture 
that is capable of changing inputs to correspond to redefinitions of the 
service that is being provided.  At the same time, those persons responsible 
for narrower tasks, such as document review or deposition summaries, will 
need to know enough about the broader picture to recognize information 
that may prompt a redefinition of the objectives of the representation.  Law 
firms, legal departments, and other lawyers therefore must be aware of the 
distinct challenges that decomposition can raise in the provision of legal 
services. 
2.  Asset Specificity 
Assuming that some decomposition of services is feasible, law firms 
must then focus on asset specificity to determine which tasks are most 
suitable for completion by persons inside and outside the firm.  That is, 
which resources are integral to the firm’s performance of its core functions 
and which are not?  In general terms, the basic function of law firms is to 
provide legal services, with specific firms defining their core functions in 
different ways depending upon the types of practices on which they focus.  
Law firms confront a threshold challenge, however:  it is not entirely clear 
exactly what constitutes legal services.  The organized bar has been 
notoriously unsuccessful in defining the practice of law in order to exclude 
nonlawyers from engaging in what lawyers traditionally have done.  Other 
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occupations increasingly are furnishing services that formerly were 
provided only by lawyers, such as tax advice, estate planning, organizing 
responses to requests for production of documents, litigation case 
assessment, and legal compliance monitoring.86  Legal process outsourcing 
companies are becoming involved in an expanding range of activities, 
which include legal research, contract analysis, preparation of questions for 
depositions and trial, and creation of legal documents. 
The San Diego County Bar Association, for instance, has held that a firm 
in India was not practicing law in California when it took responsibility for 
conducting legal research, developing case strategy, preparing deposition 
outlines, and drafting correspondence, pleadings, and motions in an 
intellectual property dispute in San Diego Superior Court.87  The Bar 
Association noted that “[w]hen the client asked how the attorneys 
developed the theory on which summary judgment was granted, and had 
done the work so inexpensively, the attorney told him that virtually all of 
the work was done by India-based Legalworks.”88  As long as the two-
lawyer California law firm that engaged Legalworks retained control over 
the case and reviewed the draft work performed by the contractor, the 
Indian company was deemed to be assisting a California lawyer in 
practicing law in the state, not engaging in the practice of law itself. 
The difficulty in defining law firm core functions raises a fundamental 
question:  Why would a client engage a law firm rather than contract 
directly with LPOs or other specialized suppliers to obtain the services it 
needs?  What do law firms offer that a client cannot obtain from a collection 
of providers who furnish particular types of services? 
Rio Tinto, for instance, says that it will continue to turn to law firms for 
“strategic expertise.”89  Law firms thus may define their core service as 
providing clients with a broad perspective, rather than performing discrete 
tasks.  Increasingly, corporate clients in particular are looking to lawyers 
not simply for information about the law, but for practical judgment that 
takes into account a wide variety of business, reputational, and political 
considerations.
Parties other than law firms, however, can furnish this service.  For 
example, one reason for Rio Tinto’s arrangement with CPA Global is that it 
frees up inside counsel to take on more strategic work.  Lawyers inside the 
company, in fact, may be in a better position to do this work than law firms 
are, since Rio Tinto’s lawyers know the company better and, at least 
theoretically, have interests more aligned with a client that is their 
employer.  Furthermore, lawyers have no monopoly on the ability to 
provide such advice.  Companies may call upon bankers, management 
86. See generally THOMAS D. MORGAN, THE VANISHING AMERICAN LAWYER (2010); 
Tanina Rostain, The Emergence of “Law Consultants,” 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1397 (2006). 
 87. San Diego County Bar Ass’n, Ethics Op. 2007-1 (2007), http://www.sdcba.org/
index.cfm?Pg=ethicsopinion07-1. 
88. Id.
 89. Breaking New Ground, supra note 1, at 15. 
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consultants, large accounting firms, or communications companies to help 
analyze and devise strategies for dealing with complex situations. 
Law firms will need to articulate reasons why clients should turn to them 
rather than other professionals for such assistance.  This will require them 
to think more deeply about what constitutes judgment and how it can be 
nurtured.  Will they be able to inculcate judgment in their lawyers in an age 
of increasing specialization?  To what extent will law firm lawyers have 
opportunities to cultivate a wide-ranging sense of judgment when many of 
them work on specific projects that may give them only a narrow 
perspective on the client?  An individual firm will not only need to consider 
these questions, but also identify how its answers distinguish the firm from 
its competitors. 
Even if a firm is able to develop a core function that consists of providing 
wise judgment, this is an activity that is unlikely to support law firms of the 
size that many have become.  How might firms of 1000 or more define their 
core activity?  One claim might be that they are able to provide efficiencies 
of scale and scope that make it more profitable to turn to them rather than to 
a group of separate suppliers. 
Firms may not be currently organized, however, to achieve this 
advantage.  Specifically, what incentive do firms have to be efficient when 
their pricing model is based on hourly billing?  Increasing efficiency in 
providing a service means either doing a given amount of work in less time, 
or more work in a given period of time.  In the first scenario, however, the 
time that is saved must be billed to some other project in order to avoid a 
decline in revenue.  Likewise, in the second scenario the time that would 
have been allocated to performing the additional work must now be filled 
with other projects or the firm’s revenue will drop.  Under an hourly billing 
system, in other words, efficiency does not necessarily pay off for the firm. 
One important predicate for a large firm credibly to maintain that its size 
enables it to provide services efficiently thus seems to be that it uses a 
pricing model based on fixed fees, a specific budget, or some variant of this 
approach.  This in turn will lead a firm to place more of a premium on 
building organizational capital—routines, procedures, and ways of doing 
things that enhance the ability of firm members to provide service 
efficiently.  To the extent that firms move toward this model, they may be 
better able to offer a distinctive reason for clients to use their services. 
Alternatively, large law firms may argue that they are well-suited to serve 
as project managers for matters on which clients use a variety of specialized 
suppliers.  This function could be of growing importance if clients continue 
to have a demand for large, complex projects.90  We will defer detailed 
discussion of their ability to play this role until later in this article.91
Suffice it to say at this point that most lawyers are not trained in the skills 
necessary to serve as project managers, nor do law firms currently have as 
90. See Thomas et al., supra note 70, at 138–42. 
91. See infra Part II.A.2. 
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much experience as accounting, consulting, or engineering firms in 
coordinating projects that involve a large number of separate parties.  
Successfully defining project management as a core law firm function, 
therefore, will require firms to develop more expertise in tasks to which 
they traditionally have not systematically devoted attention. 
As a result, a given law firm may be able to engage in an analysis of asset 
specificity by determining what core activities distinguish it from other 
firms.  This process will provide some guidance on which functions to 
perform within the firm and which to outsource to independent suppliers.  
In the long term, however, the firm will need to provide a persuasive 
explanation of how the services it offers are distinctive compared to those 
available from a wide range of organizations beyond other law firms. 
3.  Risks 
Even if firms are able to decompose their work to a significant extent and 
determine which portions should be done inside and outside the firm, they 
must deal with the risks that outsourcing can pose.  A firm that outsources 
some functions is surrendering some degree of oversight and creating a 
measure of dependence on a contractual party.  This practice creates the risk 
of both lapses in quality and supplier opportunism, since “[t]he outsourcing 
vendor controls the activity, while the outsourcing firm ‘owns’ the result.”92
Concern about poor performance by outside suppliers may be especially 
acute for law firms because of their belief that reputation is an important 
consideration for clients in selecting firms in a highly competitive market.  
Sociologist Joel Podolny defines reputation as “an expectation of some 
behavior or behaviors based on past demonstrations of those same 
behaviors.”93  Reputation can be especially valuable when it is difficult for 
consumers to evaluate the quality of a good or service.  In that situation, a 
consumer may give significant weight to a producer’s past behavior and 
how others have assessed it.  It can be hard for a client to evaluate the 
quality of legal services that firms are likely to provide, especially when 
several firms seem able to do the work.94  An unblemished reputation may 
make the difference in some cases.  It is an asset that can be threatened 
when firms rely on outside providers; a single botched assignment could 
damage the firm’s reputation for high-quality work in comparison to that of 
its peers.  As professionals trained to anticipate and advise on how to 
 92. Geis, supra note 24, at 962. 
 93. JOEL M. PODOLNY, STATUS SIGNALS: A SOCIOLOGICAL STUDY OF MARKET 
COMPETITION 13 (2005). 
 94. This is true for professional services generally.  As Jay Lorsch and Thomas Tierney 
observe, “it is exceptionally difficult to measure the quality of professional services, much 
less the actual value they add.  In many client relationships, the professionals work so 
closely with their client counterparts that it’s hard to say at the end of the day who did what, 
client or service provider.” JAY W. LORSCH & THOMAS J. TIERNEY, ALIGNING THE STARS:
HOW TO SUCCEED WHEN PROFESSIONALS DRIVE RESULTS 17 (2002). 
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control risks, lawyers may be loath to relinquish the control that ostensibly 
comes from having tasks performed within a single organization. 
Increasing sophistication in outsourcing arrangements may assuage this 
concern to some extent.  George Geis suggests that outsourcing has grown 
significantly in the last several years in part because of the emergence of 
various ways in which firms can address agency costs.95  One such strategy, 
for instance, is staged contractual commitment, whereby firms initially 
outsource only a small amount of work and keep contracts relatively brief 
in duration.96  As time goes on, and the outsource service provider shows 
itself to be more trustworthy, contract length tends to expand, as does direct 
monitoring of the outsourced projects.97  Other approaches include inducing 
competition and enhancing evaluation by performing some of the work 
inside the firm, or contracting with multiple suppliers; providing financial 
incentives to meet certain performance benchmarks and achieve cost 
savings; and providing for explicit monitoring, control, and exit rights.98
Finally, a firm may decide to take ownership of a “captive” outsourcing 
company.  This can significantly lessen concerns about quality and potential 
opportunism, as well as achieve cost savings, but does not give a firm the 
full benefits of being able to adjust its workforce in response to variations in 
demand.99
Finally, even if quality of service is not an issue, law firms may be wary 
of outsourcing because of concerns about status.  While reputation 
represents expectations based on past behavior, status reflects an actor’s 
position in a hierarchy of value.100  Honda has a reputation for producing 
high-quality automobiles, for instance, but it has a lower status than 
Mercedes among automobile companies.  Podolny suggests that consumers 
use status to evaluate a good or service when “the existence of a reputation 
for a valued quality does not necessarily eliminate the uncertainty that 
market participants have about the presence or extent of that valued 
quality.”101  The greater the uncertainty about a firm’s product, the more 
likely the consumer is to infer quality from status.  Imagine, for instance, 
that a passenger is given the choice of flying on an airplane manufactured 
by Mercedes or by Honda.  Both companies have reputations for producing 
vehicles of good quality.  The passenger is likely to choose the plane 
manufactured by Mercedes, however, because of its higher status, from 
which she infers superior airplane quality. 
A crucial feature of status is that it is dependent on associations and 
relationships with others.  Those of high status (and those who aspire to it) 
95. See Geis, supra note 24, at 962; see also Ravi Aron et al., Monitoring Process 
Quality in Off-Shore Outsourcing:  A Model and Findings from Multi-country Survey, 26 J.
OPERATIONS MGMT. 303, 305 (2008). 
96. See Geis, supra note 24, at 984–89. 
97. See id. at 988. 
98. Id. at 983–84. 
99. Id. at 965–66. 
 100. PODOLNY, supra note 93, at 13. 
101. Id. at 18. 
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are careful to associate only with those of comparable status.  If a high-
status actor associates with a low-status one, the former loses status while 
the other gains it.  Tiffany & Co., for instance, preserves its status by selling 
only certain items made by particular producers.  It would risk losing status 
if it began to sell plastic necklaces, or jewelry by manufacturers whose 
goods are sold at Wal-Mart, despite the fact that its reputation would 
suggest that these products would be of high quality. 
Status traditionally has been important to law firms because of the 
difficulty in assessing the value of legal services.  Law firms who seek to 
attain or maintain high status, for instance, will eschew or abandon certain 
practice areas because they are not regarded as sufficiently prestigious.  One 
example is Dechert LLP, which decided to let its state tax practice go, even 
though it was generating $10 million a year in revenue.  The reason was 
because the practice was not seen as compatible with the firm’s goal of 
being one of the ten to twenty firms that would represent the world’s largest 
companies in their most important matters.102  It is not hard to imagine that 
some firms might be reluctant to engage in outsourcing on their own 
initiative for fear that openly associating with companies who do routine or 
commodity work will tarnish their status. 
This reluctance may fade, however, for two reasons.  First, clients are 
devising ways of evaluating many law firm services.  To the extent that this 
reduces uncertainty about quality, clients presumably will rely less on status 
as a basis for their selection of firms.  Second, prestigious law firms such as 
members of the Magic Circle and others have begun to rely more 
substantially on outsourcing.103  Indeed, Clifford Chance recently 
announced that it was hiring two lawyers from its legal support center in 
Gurgaon as associates in the firm.104  This suggests that firms may be able 
to engage in this practice without suffering a diminution in status, because 
102. See Julie Triedman, Top Design, AM. LAW., May 2007, at 135.  It is true that the 
firm could not charge fees for state tax work that are as high as those for high-end corporate 
work, but there is a close relationship between price and status in which it is difficult to tease 
out which variable causes the other. 
103. See Kit Chellel, Slaughters in Talks over Outsourcing Plans, LAWYER, Oct. 5, 2009, 
http://www.thelawyer.com/slaughters-in-talks-over-outsourcing-plans/1002151.article; Kian 
Ganz, Clifford Chance Offshore Indian Lawyers Work on 300 Deals, LEGALLY INDIA.COM,
Sept. 25, 2009, http://www.legallyindia.com/20090925213/Law-firms/Clifford-Chance-
offshore-Indian-lawyers-work-on-300-deals; Luke McLeod-Roberts, A&O Signs 
Outsourcing Deal with LPO Provider Integreon, LAWYER, Nov. 18, 2009, 
http://www.thelawyer.com/ao-signs-outsourcing-deal-with-lpo-provider-
integreon/1002662.article; Claire Ruckin, Leading City Firms in Talks To Bring in Teams of 
Contract Lawyers, LEGAL WK., Oct. 29, 2009, http://www.legalweek.com/legal-
week/news/1560094/leading-city-firms-talks-bring-teams; Emma Sandowski, Eight More 
U.K. Top 30 Firms Size Up Legal Outsourcing Moves, AM. LAW., Nov. 23, 2009,  
http://www.law.com/jsp/law/LawArticleFriendly.jsp?id=1202435664784.
104. Clifford Chance Promotes Two Lawyers from LPO into Firm, LEGALLY INDIA.COM,
Nov. 23, 2009, http://www.legallyindia.com/20091123301/Legal-Process-Outsourcing-
LPO/Clifford-Chance-promotes-two-lawyers-from-LPO-into-firm.  The two will join the 
firm at the level of newly qualified lawyers. Id.  One will work with the firm’s Abu Dhabi 
capital markets team, while the other will work in the banking group in London. Id.
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outsourcing is becoming a standard expectation of clients.  It does remain to 
be seen, however, whether firms whose brands are less established will be 
able to take the initiative without any loss of status. 
4.  Summary 
Law firms appear able to some degree to undertake the decomposition of 
their services that scholarship on the make or buy decision indicates is 
necessary for outsourcing.  Clients and LPOs will provide both templates 
and competitive incentive for firms to expand these efforts.  Fluidity in 
defining legal service outputs—and therefore inputs—may require 
especially close ongoing integration of decomposed services with more 
complex activities.  In addition, the relevance of asset specificity will 
require law firm leaders to devote more attention to the question of what 
distinctive services law firms in general and their own firms in particular 
can provide. 
Finally, uncertainty about the performance of outside suppliers may lead 
firms in the near future to conclude that relying more on “captive” rather 
than independent LPOs is worth the lesser flexibility in adjusting the size of 
their workforces.  For some firms, the concern may be sufficiently weighty 
that they prefer to hire lawyers in staff or specialist positions in the firm 
rather than rely much on LPOs.  Client preferences and perceptions, 
however, are likely to shape this decision to a significant degree.  If clients 
become more comfortable with the use of LPOs, they may begin to insist 
that law firms use them more often.  Firms also may believe that clients are 
starting to rely more on metrics than reputation or status in evaluating law 
firm services, which may ease their concern about using LPOs. 
Assessing the potential future relevance of the make or buy decision for 
law firms thus will require much sharper focus on the components that 
constitute the provision of legal service.  Furthermore, the relevance of 
asset specificity to the outsourcing decision may lead to fundamental 
questions about the nature of legal work.  This analysis may in turn result in 
the realization that many of the activities associated with providing such 
services can be performed by nonlawyers, and that this universe may be 
expanding.  This suggests that the impact of outsourcing on lawyers’ 
understanding of the services they provide, on their professional identity, 
and on legal education may be especially fruitful areas of research. 
As manufacturing and service firms have engaged in more outsourcing, 
researchers have identified specific challenges that arise when production 
extends beyond the boundaries of the firm.  The next part discusses some of 
these challenges, which law firms will need to take into account in 
determining which activities might be suitable for outsourcing. 
II. EMPIRICAL RESEARCH ON DISAGGREGATION
Empirical work in several disciplines has identified a number of issues 
that arise for organizations as the make or buy decision becomes a 
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potentially more salient feature of their operations.  Much of this work has 
focused in particular on the implications of relying on outsourcing as an 
integral part of the production process.  This section discusses research on 
the challenges of ensuring that work performed outside the firm is fully 
integrated into the production process; coordinating projects for which 
networks of organizations are responsible; managing the transfer of 
knowledge inside and outside of firms that are participants in a supply 
chain; and addressing the impact of using contingent workers on an 
organization’s workforce, structure, and culture.  A review of this research 
suggests considerations that law firms will need to assess if they begin 
significantly to extend the process of providing services beyond their 
formal boundaries.  Discussing the research also is intended to introduce 
concepts that may become increasingly relevant to law firms but that 
currently are not commonly used to analyze their operations.  Considering 
how these concepts are applicable to law firms may prompt us to rethink 
how to conceptualize these firms and what they do. 
A. Process Integration
1.  Overview of Research 
One motive for moving from vertical integration to greater reliance on 
supply chains of multiple outside providers is to reduce fixed overhead 
costs.  Companies that move in this direction reduce the cost of retaining 
employees in charge of supervising the production of inputs.  They turn to 
vendors as an alternative, to obtain components designed to meet the 
company’s specifications.  This option gives them the flexibility to reduce 
costs when demand wanes or technology changes by cutting back on orders 
from suppliers, rather than incurring the costs connected with laying off 
employees on the payroll. 
Firms can gain this advantage by establishing a supply chain, but they 
need to appreciate that this model of production does not eliminate the need 
for personnel who can coordinate activities among members of the chain.  
The absence of such coordination can make production more expensive and 
prone to error than if the company had retained the fixed overhead costs 
associated with remaining more vertically integrated.  Vertical 
disintegration thus is not simply a process of hollowing out the permanent 
workforce and replacing it with outside contractors.  As three scholars have 
observed, “disintegration . . . can be viewed as the ‘other side of the coin’ of 
systems integration.  Firms can only outsource if they acquire the capability 
to integrate the components, knowledge, or software then produced by their 
specialist suppliers and subcontractors.”105
In manufacturing, for instance, some theorists suggest that the creation of 
modular components and standard protocols that specify how they relate to 
 105. Michael Hobday, Andrew Davies & Andrea Prencipe, Systems Integration:  A Core 
Capability of the Modern Corporation, 14 INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE 1109, 1124 (2005). 
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one another minimizes the need for any overarching managerial authority 
over the process.  The argument is that the transfer of codified information 
embedded in components of the production chain can smoothly coordinate 
decentralized activities.106  In this way, the “modular architecture” of the 
production process ostensibly obviates the need for traditional oversight. 
Critics of this view point out, however, that there are limits to the ability 
of modularity to substitute for managerial coordination.  “[T]he ‘digitizing’ 
of a product’s characteristics by designers involves simplification, and 
digitized models must subsequently be ‘re-actualized’ by the human teams 
responsible for production.”107  As a result, “many production processes 
still require close personal contacts involving the transfer of tacit 
knowledge.”108  Furthermore, even if a production process could be 
completely modularized, it would operate as a closed system incapable of 
adjusting to new circumstances.  Firms need the ability to modify 
production in response to changing conditions and new information.  
Echoing a point made earlier, higher-order problem solving capacity is 
necessary in order to decompose production in new ways with different 
modules in order to respond to such challenges.  While firms may reduce 
the number of components that they directly produce, they need to retain a 
broad base of knowledge in order to engage in ongoing problem solving.  In 
other words, they need to “know more than they make.”109
Moving beyond the coordination and design of components that a 
company outsources, integration also requires the capacity to determine 
what activities at various steps of the supply chain should be produced 
internally or by outside vendors.  Advances in information and 
communications technology mean that firms increasingly are engaged on an 
ongoing basis in make or buy decisions.  The ability to make these 
decisions requires a broad perspective on the firm’s strategies and needs, for 
which the information embedded in a modular production process cannot 
substitute.  Having such a broad perspective “enable[s] firms to move 
selectively up- and downstream in the marketplace through the 
simultaneous ‘twin’ processes of vertical integration and disintegration,” so 
that they can “gain the advantages of both outsourcing and vertical 
integration through different phases of the product life cycle.”110
106. See Ron Sanchez & Joseph T. Mahoney, Modularity, Flexibility, and Knowledge 
Management in Product and Organization Design, 17 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 63, 70–73 
(1996).
 107. Hobday et al., supra note 105, at 1127. 
108. Id.
 109. Stefano Brusoni, Andrea Prencipe & Keith Pavitt, Knowledge Specialization, 
Organizational Coupling, and the Boundaries of the Firm:  Why Do Firms Know More Than 
They Make?, 46 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 597, 597 (2001); see also Ove Granstrand, Pari Patel & 
Keith Pavitt, Multi-technology Corporations:  Why They Have “Distributed” Rather Than 
“Distinctive Core” Competencies, 39 CAL. MGMT. REV. 8, 22–24 (1997) (noting that large 
firms are more diversified in technologies that they master than in the products that they 
make).
 110. Hobday et al., supra note 105, at 1111 (footnote omitted). 
2162 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 78 
The capability to engage successfully in this process is becoming an 
important asset for many leading companies.  As one scholar puts it with 
respect to offshoring, for instance, “the knowledge and skills associated 
with the complex activity of determining which services to offshore 
outsource, where, to whom and how to structure the relationship may be an 
important source of competitive advantage . . . . that the firm should protect, 
just like any type of intellectual property.”111  Furthermore, some 
companies not only cultivate these skills for their own activities but are 
developing project coordination and integration expertise that they can 
market to other companies. 
Some research suggests that lead firms may need to maintain a 
significant capacity to perform work inside the firm in order to integrate 
effectively activities by multiple providers on a project.  In construction 
projects in which tasks within a stage are highly interdependent, for 
instance, one study indicates that there are fewer cost overruns in a stage 
when the lead firm does most of the work in that stage than if a contractor 
does so, or the work is evenly divided between the lead firm and the 
contractor.112  When stages are highly interdependent, this division of work 
has the same impact on cost overruns in subsequent project stages.  The 
authors conclude, “[W]hen the bulk of highly interdependent activities were 
performed outside the owners’ firm boundaries, owners experienced the 
most problems controlling projects and, as a result, experienced the highest 
cost overruns.”113
More generally, the authors note that in other sectors “coordination and 
control issues arising from the division of work and responsibilities across 
organizational boundaries have been blamed for a plethora of highly visible 
project failures and challenges.”114  In complex projects with 
interdependent phases, coordinating work among organizational units 
requires considerable information-processing capabilities.  The challenge is 
magnified because outsourced activities in such projects generally do not 
provide standard products or services but are customized for the project.  
This means that the information that must be exchanged tends to be 
idiosyncratic.  Furthermore, the larger the number of participants in the 
supply chain, the greater the “extended interorganizational negotiation 
[that] will be necessary to resolve disagreements.”115
Moving from vertical integration to greater reliance on a supply chain, 
therefore, may result in a reduction in a firm’s permanent workforce, but the 
firm must have the capacity to integrate the work of multiple producers 
without the benefit of a single organizational hierarchy.  In addition, there 
 111. Ellram et al., supra note 60, at 160–61. 
112. See generally Pamsy P. Hui, Alison Davis-Blake & Joseph P. Broschak, Managing 
Interdependence:  The Effects of Outsourcing Structure on the Performance of Complex 
Projects, 39 DECISION SCI. 5 (2008). 
113. Id. at 24. 
114. Id. at 7. 
115. Id. at 8. 
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may be some cases in which effective integration requires that the firm 
retain the ability to perform a substantial amount of the work itself.  For 
these reasons, a less vertically integrated firm cannot afford simply to be a 
hollow organization that delegates responsibilities to contractual partners. 
2.  Law Firms 
To the extent that disaggregation becomes more common in legal 
services, process integration capability will become increasingly important.  
Richard Susskind suggests, 
[I]n the future, one individual organization will, I believe, tend to take 
overall responsibility for the delivery of the completed and delivered legal 
service when multi-sourced, even though several organizations and 
systems may have contributed.  This organization may be a form of main 
contractor, acting as the overall project manager of the service, and so 
coordinating all the various inputs.  This contractor will lend its brand to 
the exercise, thus securing the confidence of the purchaser.  And, further, 
this contractor-manager will establish quality systems and procedures to 
ensure that the work is undertaken to an appropriate standard.116
This development could create market opportunities for law firms.  Some 
global law firms, such as the Magic Circle firms, may already provide this 
service for large transnational matters.  Other law firms that develop this 
capability could follow.  Susskind points out, however, that other types of 
organizations could do so as well, such as large accounting, software, or 
publishing firms.  In the latter scenario, law firms might “be relegated to the 
function of technical legal subcontractor.”117
Even on the more modest scale of individual projects, law firms may 
need to develop better project management skills than many currently 
possess.  Lawyers generally receive no exposure to management principles 
in law school, and few of them receive any systematic training in law firms.  
Lawyers who serve in management positions in firms usually do so on the 
basis of their work as practicing lawyers, since there is no established track 
within firms for attorneys who are interested in moving into positions of 
authority.  Lawyers who coordinate the work of litigation or transactional 
teams also tend to be successful lawyers who have good relationships with 
clients, rather than those who have demonstrated the ability to manage 
projects.  The qualities that are valuable in building a successful law 
practice are not necessarily those that make for an effective manager. 
Furthermore, to the extent that lawyers do have experience in 
coordinating the work of project teams, those teams largely consist of 
members of the same firm.  In these situations, lawyers can rely on a 
hierarchical structure of authority to manage the work of team members.  
While increasing disaggregation is creating teams with more diverse 
organizational affiliations, lawyers generally have only limited experience 
 116. SUSSKIND, supra note 33, at 50–51. 
117. Id. at 51. 
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coordinating the work of a large number of service providers across 
multiple organizational boundaries. 
Firms in recent years have hired increasing numbers of nonlawyers in 
administrative positions within the firm.  These employees could be in a 
position to assume project management responsibilities. Currently, 
however, they mainly help manage the business side of the firm, working 
on financial or strategic planning rather than exercising any oversight over 
project teams.  The fact that they are not lawyers might make it difficult for 
them to assume the latter responsibility, since many lawyers may resist any 
effort by a nonlawyer to direct any of their work.  Indeed, ethical rules are 
designed to limit the ability of nonlawyers to influence a lawyer’s provision 
of legal services to a client.  Rule 5.4(d)(2) of the ABA Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct, for instance, states that a lawyer shall not practice in 
an organization in which a nonlawyer is a corporate director or officer or 
occupies any similar position of authority.118  We may need to rethink such 
rules so that they apply only to efforts to influence a lawyer’s professional 
judgment, rather than to those cases in which a nonlawyer is in a position of 
authority over a team that contains lawyers among its members. 
B. Networks
1.  Overview of Research 
Another aspect of pressures toward disaggregation is the emergence of 
networks as the locus of production in many economic sectors.  
Traditionally, the production process occurs within a single firm, 
orchestrated by a command and control decision process based on 
organizational rules.  As transaction costs of exchanges with outside parties 
decline, firms may turn more to markets to obtain inputs that formerly were 
produced within the firm.  Relationships among actors in such cases are 
organized by contract.  In Williamson’s terms, firms rely to varying degrees 
on hierarchies and markets as ways of organizing production.119
With advances in information and communications technology, 
companies increasingly can rely on a variety of specialized outside firms to 
produce various components, with the lead company assuming the role of 
assembling the final pieces or simply marketing the product to end users.  
As Walter Powell puts it, more and more firms are involved in an “intricate 
latticework” of collaborations with outsiders that spreads the core activities 
of the firm across a wider array of participants.120  This process of vertical 
disintegration creates a supply chain that often stretches across the globe, as 
 118. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.4(d)(2) (2009). 
 119. WILLIAMSON, supra note 31, at xi. 
 120. Powell, supra note 10, at 58. 
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companies seek out the firms that are the most cost-efficient and innovative 
to furnish various links in the chain.121
The relationships that emerge in this process extend across the 
boundaries of any single firm.  At the same time, they involve a degree of 
collaboration, cooperation, and ongoing reliance that distinguishes them 
from standard arms-length transactions in the spot market.  Firms deal with 
one another based on expectations of continuing involvement, equipped 
with distinctive knowledge about each other’s operations and requirements.  
This can both enhance productive efficiency and provide the foundation for 
innovation as new technologies, needs, and markets develop.  As a 
consequence,
fixing the boundaries of an organization becomes a nearly impossible 
task, as relationships with suppliers, subcontractors, and even competitors 
evolve in unexpected ways.  As these network ties proliferate and deepen, 
it becomes more sensible to exercise voice rather than exit.  A mutual 
orientation between parties may be established, based on knowledge that 
the parties assume each has about the other and upon which they draw in 
communication and problem solving.  Fixed contracts are thus ineffectual, 
as expectations, rather than being frozen, change as circumstances 
dictate.122
As the interorganizational network becomes a basic unit of analysis, 
firms respond by entering into relational contracts that intentionally leave 
some terms open and subject to mutual definition by the parties as 
circumstances evolve.  In other words, they do not rely wholly on either 
hierarchies or markets to organize production. 
Perhaps the paradigmatic form of a network is the Japanese vertical 
keiretsu, found in both the manufacturing and services sectors.123  This is a 
group of several hundred companies organized under the aegis of a single 
final assembler or service provider.  The most successful industries that 
employ this form are automobile and electrical equipment companies.  
Group members consist mainly of two types of companies:  first, those that 
formerly were divisions or departments of the lead firm, which have been 
spun off as separate companies, and, second, formerly independent 
companies that have developed a long-term relationship with the lead firm, 
often as a supplier. 
In the manufacturing sector, the lead firm focuses on high-end 
manufacturing, consisting mainly of final assembly, and on research and 
development for core businesses of the keiretsu.  Other firms produce and 
assemble components by using simpler subcomponents produced by other 
affiliates that comprise a supply chain spanning the formal boundaries of 
several organizations.  While group members are preferred suppliers, the 
121. See Joel M. Podolny & Karen L. Page, Network Forms of Organization, 24 ANN.
REV. SOC. 57, 57–58 (1998). 
 122. Powell, supra note 10, at 59. 
 123. D. Eleanor Westney, Japanese Enterprise Faces the Twenty-First Century, in THE
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY FIRM, supra note 10, at 118. 
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lead firm also obtains some components from companies outside the 
keiretsu.  This practice “disciplines pricing on both sides” and permits 
suppliers to “build larger scale economies than would be possible for a 
captive supplier.”124
The keiretsu is only the most prominent example of how disaggregation 
and multisourcing is leading to the demise of the vertically integrated firm 
in several industries.  This trend is most evident in sectors subject to rapid 
technological change, where companies need to retain flexibility and avoid 
incurring significant overhead costs for processes or products that may 
become obsolete.  Such a development can change the nature of 
competition itself, since “selection increasingly operates at the network 
level as rivalry shifts from firm-versus-firm to coalition-versus-
collaboration.”125
2.  Law Firms 
Within the legal services sector, corporate legal departments have done 
more than law firms to utilize the network as a unit of production.  These 
departments regularly must decide whether to make or buy legal services 
and have outsourced work to law firms for many years.  They use a variety 
of outside firms to provide legal services to their companies, typically 
relying on different firms for expertise in particular specialties.  In recent 
years, corporations have begun to reduce the number of outside firms they 
use, creating preferred provider networks consisting in some cases of a 
handful of firms.126  In return for a guarantee of a certain amount of 
business, firms who win the competition to participate in these networks 
agree to share work product with all other preferred firms and to work with 
the client to explore fee arrangements that provide predictable legal costs, 
create incentives for efficient service delivery, and assign to the firms some 
of the risks of the representation.  Such a network reflects reliance on 
relational contracts to govern relationships that are neither wholly located 
within the company nor simple arms-length spot market transactions. 
Corporations also have been the most active users of LPOs, sending 
considerable amounts of routine legal work to vendors in lower-cost 
locations such as India and the Philippines.  Many insist that their outside 
law firms utilize such vendors in their representations of the company, and 
some clients designate particular LPOs that firms must use.  In this way, 
corporations begin to construct supply chains consisting of a variety of 
outside entities that focus on discrete aspects of a given legal representation. 
Efficiency pressures have begun to move law firms in recent years to 
look outside their organizations for providers who can perform specific 
tasks connected with representation.  Firms increasingly use contract 
124. Id. (citation omitted). 
 125. Powell, supra note 10, at 68. 
126. See David B. Wilkins, Team of Rivals? Toward a New Model of the Corporate 
Attorney-Client Relationship, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 2067 (2010). 
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lawyers for relatively routine work that used to be done by associates, and 
are likely to use them even more in the future to avoid the excess capacity 
that has required layoffs at many firms during the recent recession.  Firms 
are also using LPOs for services such as document review, factual analysis, 
and legal research.  Furthermore, the complexity and expense of electronic 
discovery has led a large number of firms to rely on e-discovery vendors 
and information technology specialty companies as key members of 
litigation teams.  Firms also may assemble lawyers from more than one firm 
to handle large litigation or transactions, with each firm focusing on a 
particular aspect of the engagement, such as discovery, settlement, or 
courtroom advocacy.  When a matter raises issues in a jurisdiction in which 
a firm does not have an office or a substantial presence, the firm may rely 
on a referral network to identify someone who can work on that aspect of 
the matter.127
Corporate legal departments will likely continue to use networks for the 
provision of legal services more frequently than law firms.  First, they are 
part of larger business organizations in which outsourcing is both accepted 
and encouraged.  Second, as is any business unit of a company, they are 
subject to continuing pressures to hold down costs and operate efficiently.  
Their current reliance on networks is a direct response to these pressures, 
reflecting the opportunities that advances in communications and 
information technology have made available.  The goal of achieving 
efficiencies also has prompted departments to develop more sophisticated 
benchmarks and metrics to use in evaluating, pricing, and monitoring the 
provision of legal services, expertise that will be useful as the trend toward 
disaggregation continues.  Finally, legal departments are regarded as cost 
centers or support functions within the larger corporation, as opposed to 
activities that constitute the core of a company’s business.  Conventional 
management theory argues that such noncore functions are especially 
suitable for make or buy decisions.128
Continuing and perhaps increasing use of networks by legal departments 
means that corporate counsel may begin to function more as general 
contractors who coordinate activities among a multitude of suppliers that 
make contributions at various points in the legal services value chain.  If so, 
project management skills will become more important for such lawyers, as 
will the ability to structure governance arrangements that align incentives as 
much as possible among network members.  Departments may also turn 
more to nonlawyers with such skills, much as many have come to rely on 
corporate procurement officers in negotiating the terms of law firm 
engagements. 
Law firms also are likely to rely more on networks to provide legal 
services in response to increasing pressure from clients to be cost-efficient.  
 127. The Lex Mundi network of 21,000 lawyers in 160 firms around the world is the most 
extensive such network. See Lex Mundi, http://www.lexmundi.com/lexmundi/Default.asp
(last visited Feb. 28, 2010). 
128. See Sako, supra note 9, at 3–4. 
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There may be features of law firm practice, however, that limit how 
extensive these networks become.  First, of course, legal services are a core 
function of a law firm, not support services.  While there are some 
exceptions, conventional management theory generally maintains that an 
organization should be cautious in outsourcing such an activity. 
Second, as our previous discussion has suggested, law firms may have 
some concern that contracting with outside vendors to help provide services 
will undermine their reputation and status.129  They may fear that using 
more outside suppliers runs the risk of damaging their reputation because of 
the difficulty in ensuring that such providers deliver exemplary service.  
They may also be wary that association with entities that do commodity 
work will diminish their image of providing services that require irreducible 
intellectual sophistication and complex judgment.   
Law firms may be especially concerned about their ability to supervise 
vendors adequately because of the risk that contractors could be charged 
with the unauthorized practice of law.  LPOs are now engaged in activities 
that lawyers performed a decade ago or less.  They avoid unauthorized 
practice claims by maintaining that they compile and synthesize 
information that lawyers use in providing legal services.  This 
characterization is tenable as long as lawyers are involved in supervising 
the work of contractors.  State bar authorities vary in their approach to 
unauthorized practice, however, which creates uncertainty about the level of 
supervision deemed adequate and the extent of contractor discretion that is 
deemed sufficient to avoid violating bar rules. 
One final consideration that could limit law firm reliance on networks is 
that decisions about staffing tend to be made in firms on a decentralized 
basis by partners in charge of the various matters that the firm handles.  To 
the extent that firms currently rely on networks, these networks tend to exist 
for specific projects and may not continue for matters involving different 
lawyers or clients.  The use of networks as a unit of production thus varies 
among lawyers and practices within a firm, with origination and 
engagement partners likely to be most influential in determining whether to 
create and rely on them. 
This can make it difficult for a firm to pursue a consistent policy 
regarding the use of outside service providers.  Individual partners’ 
willingness to work with providers will vary, and will be influenced 
significantly by a client’s attitude toward such collaboration.  The extent to 
which this continues to be an obstacle will depend in large measure on how 
widely clients insist on fee arrangements that depart from hourly billing and 
create incentives for efficient delivery of services.  If these arrangements 
become common practice, they could generate the support from influential 
partners that law firm management needs to implement a standard approach 
to the creation of networks to provide legal services. 
129. See supra notes 93–104 and accompanying text. 
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In sum, as disaggregation of legal services continues, we may see some 
vertical disintegration among providers who rely more on a network of 
outside parties to obtain the inputs they need to deliver services to clients.  
This trend may be especially prominent among corporate legal departments, 
who have both comfort and expertise with it.  While law firms may be more 
cautious, efficiency pressures and greater client reliance on metrics, rather 
than reputation and status, in selecting outside firms may begin to lessen 
their resistance. 
C. Knowledge Transfer
1.  Overview of Research 
Two scholars of outsourcing suggest that “the most significant impact of 
contingent work may be on the knowledge stock of the firm and, through 
that, on its long-term competitive position.”130  Outsourcing can result in 
the transfer of knowledge into the firm from outside suppliers who provide 
access to emerging best practices and innovative approaches to producing 
goods and services.  It also can create the risk that knowledge that 
constitutes part of a firm’s competitive advantage will be disclosed to 
outside parties and the public at large.  Firms therefore ideally structure 
outsourcing arrangements so as to maximize the likelihood of acquiring 
new knowledge that they can convert into an organizational asset and to 
minimize the prospect that the firm will transfer knowledge to parties 
outside the firm that can jeopardize its competitive position.131
Sharon Matusik and Charles Hill provide a taxonomy of knowledge that 
helps clarify the opportunities and risks a firm may encounter when 
involved in outsourcing.  They first distinguish between private knowledge 
that is unique to a firm and public knowledge that is not.  The latter 
includes items such as industry and occupational best practices and 
language skills.  It cannot serve as a source of competitive advantage 
because it is available to all firms, but a firm’s failure to use it can put it at a 
disadvantage.
A firm’s private knowledge consists of components and architectural 
knowledge.  Components relate to discrete aspects of an organization’s 
operations, such as processes for new product development, inventory 
management, and customer billing.  It may be explicit or tacit.  The former 
is codified and transferable in formal systematic methods, such as rules and 
procedures, and the knowledge and skills associated with it easily can be 
taught or written down.  The latter is learned through experience and 
difficult to articulate, formalize, and transfer smoothly to others.  
Knowledge of components may be held on the individual or collective 
level.
 130. Sharon F. Matusik & Charles W. L. Hill, The Utilization of Contingent Work, 
Knowledge Creation, and Competitive Advantage, 23 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 680, 681 (1998). 
131. See generally Ellram et al., supra note 60; Matusik & Hill, supra note 130. 
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By contrast, architectural knowledge consists of organization-wide 
routines and schemas for coordinating various components and putting 
them to productive use.  It is held tacitly and collectively, since no one 
individual is in a position to see, comprehend, and describe the totality of 
this form of knowledge.  Component knowledge is embedded within and 
influenced by architectural knowledge and can be upgraded by architectural 
knowledge over time.  As an example of the latter process, Matusik and Hill 
suggest that Toyota’s architectural knowledge base emphasizes continual 
improvement in component processes through ongoing feedback on 
performance, which in turn regularly results in improvements in discrete 
components.132  They argue that “over the long run it is architectural 
knowledge that contributes most to an organization’s long-run competitive 
position.”133
Outsourcing partners can be an important source of new public and 
private knowledge for a firm.  As an example of the former, outside 
workers may expose a firm to new best practices by virtue of working on 
projects with a variety of firms.  Their work in a number of different 
organizational settings may increase their depth of knowledge about such 
practices.  They may be especially likely to be familiar with the most 
current ways of doing things since their skills tend to be evaluated by the 
market more often than those of employees who work for a single firm.  
Outsourcing arrangements, therefore, may serve to provide firms with 
access to new public knowledge in the form of industry- and occupation-
specific best practices that are available to their competitors. 
Outside workers also may stimulate the creation of new private 
knowledge within a firm.  Matusik and Hill suggest three ways in which 
this may occur.  First, outside workers may be more likely than firm 
employees to try new processes and develop ideas that are “outside of an 
organization’s repertoire of routines.”134  Second, the presence of new 
workers may prompt employees to make tacit knowledge more explicit as 
they explain to outside workers how things are done, thereby allowing a 
firm to draw on and disseminate routines and practices, as well as to 
reexamine them.  Finally, outside workers may bring into the firm public 
knowledge, which is combined with existing private knowledge to create 
new ideas and practices.  In scientific invention, for instance, “[t]he fusion 
of formerly distinct technologies into new ones is a recognized source of 
innovation.”135
 132. Matusik & Hill, supra note 130, at 685. See generally LIKER, supra note 85. 
 133. Matusik & Hill, supra note 130, at 685 (citations omitted); see also Robert M. Grant, 
Prospering in Dynamically-Competitive Environments:  Organizational Capability as 
Knowledge Integration, 7 ORG. SCI. 375, 375 (1996); Rebecca Henderson & Iain Cockburn, 
Measuring Competence?  Exploring Firm Effects in Pharmaceutical Research, 15 
STRATEGIC MGMT. J. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 63, 65 (1994); Bruce Kogut & Udo Zander, Knowledge
of the Firm, Combinative Capabilities, and the Replication of Technology, 3 ORG. SCI. 383, 
394–96 (1992). 
 134. Matusik & Hill, supra note 130, at 687. 
135. Id. at 688. 
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Mere exposure to new knowledge, however, does not ensure that a firm 
will be able to convert it into an organizational asset.  Matusik and Hill 
observe that, “[b]ecause grafting knowledge from the outside environment 
does not take place automatically, a firm needs mechanisms to bring public 
knowledge in, to transmit this knowledge within the firm, and to fuse the 
new knowledge with existing stocks of knowledge.”136  Such integrative 
mechanisms may include the creation of “boundary spanning” positions that 
serve as liaisons between the firm and outside suppliers, officially 
developing a strategy and committing resources explicitly for the purpose 
of obtaining new knowledge from outside partners, providing incentives to 
employees to acquire and use new knowledge, and encouraging outside 
workers to share information by providing rewards that may include the 
possibility of permanent employment with the firm. 
Firms also may need to take steps to overcome employee perception of 
the inferiority of contingent workers in order to enhance the flow of 
knowledge into the firm.  These steps may include creating teams of 
permanent and outside workers in settings that involve interdependence, as 
well as high-profile announcements of ways in which the acquisition and 
integration of outside knowledge has improved the performance of the firm.  
Firms concerned about lessening devaluation of outside workers will need 
to be rigorous in dismissing such workers who do not have the necessary 
skills and knowledge base. 
Outsourcing also creates the risk that a firm’s stock of private knowledge 
will be disseminated outside the firm.  Disclosure is likely to be of 
component knowledge, since outside workers are more likely to be exposed 
to knowledge related to specific tasks than to a company’s entire repertoire 
of routines, and because architectural knowledge cannot be grasped fully by 
any one individual.  As private component knowledge is converted into 
public knowledge, a firm may lose an important competitive asset.  Other 
firms may simply copy the knowledge.  They may, for instance, adopt 
certain procedures or employ particular analytical techniques that enhance 
productivity.  In attempting to imitate, they also may innovate.  Such 
innovation can render obsolete the knowledge that has been disclosed 
outside the firm.  In addition, if a supplier comes to know aspects of a 
business better than the lead firm, it may expand its operations and become 
a competitor.137
These concerns indicate that firms should take explicit steps to minimize 
the risk that outsourcing will result in the transfer of private firm knowledge 
to competitors and the public.  Such steps can include using nondisclosure 
agreements; restricting access to manuals, documents, and sensitive 
information; segregating sensitive functions and activities from outside 
workers; monitoring the type of knowledge that suppliers obtain; and 
limiting the length of contingent worker contracts or converting such 
136. Id. at 685; see also George P. Huber, Organizational Learning:  The Contributing 
Processes and the Literatures, 2 ORG. SCI. 88, 91–92 (1991). 
137. See Ellram et al., supra note 60, at 157–59. 
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workers to permanent employees if they acquire important firm-specific 
knowledge.  Matusik and Hill also suggest that as outsourcing becomes 
more prevalent, especially in sensitive professional and technical areas, 
reputational markets may become important as constraints on dissemination 
of private information by outside workers.138
Another risk of outsourcing connected with knowledge transfer is related 
to the concept of asset specificity discussed earlier.  A firm may require that 
certain forms of knowledge be developed that are tailored specifically to its 
operations.  An organization that relies on outside suppliers to develop this 
knowledge without significant involvement by the organization’s 
employees can become dependent on a supplier and make itself vulnerable 
to opportunism.  This is especially a risk if the knowledge that the outside 
party acquires is tacit knowledge, which is “gained in a learning-by-doing 
mode”139 and is “difficult to recreate and transfer.”140  As a result, 
economic theory suggests that the more firm-specific an asset, the less 
likely a firm is to rely on outsourcing to obtain it. 
Some research suggests, however, that firms may not be as sensitive to 
this risk as they should be.  Interviews with a group of high-ranking 
corporate procurement officers led researchers in one study to conclude that 
firms “are careful to avoid outsourcing of specific physical assets, but do 
not show the same level of concern for outsourcing specific knowledge 
assets.”141  They describe two examples in which firms outsourced tasks 
that required the acquisition of high levels of firm-specific knowledge.  In 
one case, a software company spent more than four weeks training its 
offshore call center workers how to respond to highly technical questions 
related directly to its product.  This type of knowledge is costly to develop 
and cannot be recovered if the firm decides to use a different supplier.  Yet 
the firm chose to rely on outside workers rather than employees to acquire 
and apply the knowledge. 
Another case involved a finance company that outsourced some of its 
software programming and began encountering price and service problems 
with the company performing the work.  When it sought to change 
suppliers, it discovered that it was highly dependent on the existing one.  
Specifically, “[o]ver time, the organization had lost its internal knowledge 
to understand the program code, and even the knowledge to develop a clear 
statement of work to effectively re-bid the item.”142  This meant that the 
firm found it difficult to identify other suppliers that could provide the same 
service, thus incurring the risk of locking itself into a relationship in which 
the supplier had superior bargaining power. 
Another risk in this situation is that a supplier may make changes to 
processes and technologies without adequately informing the firm.  This 
138. See Matusik & Hill, supra note 130, at 692. 
 139. Ellram et al., supra note 60, at 160. 
140. Id. at 161. 
141. Id. at 153. 
142. Id.
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widens the knowledge gap between the firm and the supplier, which makes 
it difficult for the firm to exercise effective control over the activity.  More 
serious is the risk that, because of its expertise, a supplier gradually may 
take on additional responsibilities that begin to implicate core strategic 
activities of the firm without adequate oversight.  This can result in the 
supplier and the firm working at cross purposes, compromising the mission 
of the firm. 
Another study found that a bank that had increased its use of contractors 
to provide information technology services failed to be attentive to the risk 
of using such workers on tasks that required a high amount of firm-specific 
skills.143  Most of this work involved modifying existing software 
applications.  These applications had been written and rewritten over the 
course of several years and generally were very poorly documented.  The 
systems were sufficiently complex that “knowledge of how to work with a 
given application could only be acquired over time, through experience 
with maintaining and modifying it.  Furthermore, there was a wide enough 
variety of different applications that only a few individuals might have 
experience in any given application.”144  The workers therefore specialized 
in a particular application or set of applications, and built up expertise on 
the specific proprietary systems that they managed.  As a result, “[w]hen 
those contractors left, other workers would struggle to work with those 
applications,” which made the company reluctant to terminate them.145
The bank’s experience illustrates that a firm that engages in outsourcing 
in order to gain flexibility in staffing can negate that benefit if it delegates 
to outside workers tasks that require the development of substantial firm-
specific knowledge.  Ignoring this consideration can effectively lock the 
firm into contractual relationships that limit its ability to adjust the size of 
its workforce based on changing business conditions.  The implication of 
this is that “knowledge can be a more powerful determinant of long term 
employment than the formal governance arrangements within which that 
relationship takes place.”146
Concern about the transfer of knowledge outside the organization has 
been one of the major reasons that conventional theory maintains that firms 
should outsource only tasks that are not integrally related to their core 
competitive activities.147  On this view, “organizations should internalize 
 143. MATTHEW BIDWELL, SOME PITFALLS OF MANAGING TALENT ON DEMAND: A CASE 
STUDY OF IT WORKERS (2009), available at http://www.industrystudies.pitt.edu/chicago09/
docs/Bidwell%202.1.pdf. 
144. Id. at 17. 
145. Id. at 23. 
146. Id. at 25. 
 147. Other reasons include concern about the potential negative impact on regular 
employees of using contingent workers and, because of historical precedent, the perception 
that outsourcing is more legitimate for some activities, such as administrative and clerical 
work, than for others. Arne L. Kalleberg & Peter V. Marsden, Externalizing Organizational 
Activities:  Where and How US Establishments Use Employment Intermediaries, 3 SOCIO-
ECON. REV. 389, 392 (2005). 
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their core activity areas by investing in the training and development of 
employees who are strategically important to the organization”148 and 
should use external sources for more peripheral functions. 
Research suggests, however, that some firms are beginning to outsource 
important activities that are related to core functions.149  These firms tend to 
operate in dynamic environments characterized by innovation that produces 
rapid changes in knowledge.  Those environments are characterized by 
“rapid technological change, short product cycles, and ‘creative 
destruction.’”150  In such cases, remaining competitive requires that a firm 
continually upgrade its stock of knowledge and avoid allowing practices 
and processes to become rigid.151  In these settings, establishing 
relationships with a network of outside suppliers who work on core 
functions can serve to expose a firm to innovative knowledge that is vital to 
the firm’s continued competitiveness. 
This trend indicates that outsourcing can be prompted by a firm’s desire 
to acquire knowledge, not simply by the goals of reducing costs and 
increasing flexibility in the use of workers.  Matusik and Hill argue that 
decisions on when and how to use contingent workers should depend on (1) 
the intensity of pressures for cost containment and a flexible workforce and 
(2) how stable or dynamic the firm’s competitive environment is—that is, 
how rapidly knowledge becomes obsolete.  The more quickly knowledge 
becomes obsolete, the less concern the firm should have about the risk that 
outsourcing will result in disclosure of knowledge outside the firm.  Their 
suggestions are worth summarizing at some length: 
Firms based in stable environments characterized by low competitive 
pressures [should] value preserving knowledge over knowledge creation 
and, thus, should make low use of contingent work.  Those based in stable 
environments characterized by high competitive pressures should make 
use of contingent work in noncore areas if there is direct cost saving.  
Firms based in dynamic environments characterized by mild competitive 
pressures should make use of contingent work in the core value-creation 
areas of the firm and limit its use elsewhere.  Finally, those firms based in 
dynamic environments characterized by intense competitive pressures 
148. Id. at 394 (citations omitted); see, e.g., Jay Barney, Firm Resources and Sustained 
Competitive Advantage, 17 J. MGMT. 99, 116–17 (1991); Nesheim et al., supra note 37, at 
249–50 (summarizing conventional view); C. K. Prahalad & Gary Hamel, The Core 
Competence of the Corporation, 90 HARV. BUS. REV. 79 (1990); see also Matusik & Hill, 
supra note 130, at 690 (“In much of the existing literature, scholars recommend a cautious 
stance toward the use of contingent work, advocating its use only outside of core value-
creation areas central to the attainment of competitive advantage.”). 
149. See, e.g., Matusik & Hill, supra note 130, at 695; Torstein Nesheim, Using External 
Work Arrangements in Core Value-Creation Areas, 21 EUR. MGMT. J. 528, 530 (2003). 
 150. Nesheim et al., supra note 37, at 250. 
 151. Laura Poppo & Todd Zenger, Testing Alternative Theories of the Firm:  Transaction 
Cost, Knowledge-Based, and Measurement Explanations for Make-or-Buy Decisions in 
Information Services, 19 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 853, 855–56 (1998). 
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should make relatively extensive use of contingent work in both core and 
noncore areas.152
Knowledge transfer thus is a significant dimension of outsourcing.  At a 
minimum, firms need to be aware of the risk that suppliers may be a conduit 
for transmitting valuable private knowledge outside the firm.  In addition, 
they need to appreciate that any outsourcing arrangement contains the 
potential for the firm to acquire new knowledge from outside parties, which 
an organization may be able to integrate into its operations.  Finally, firms 
in dynamic industries in which knowledge rapidly becomes obsolete may 
actively seek relationships with outside suppliers that provide them with 
access to innovation and emerging best practices. 
2.  Law Firms 
An analysis of the implications for law firms of the research on 
knowledge transfer reveals that the field rarely focuses on the creation and 
dissemination of knowledge when assessing legal services.  In particular, 
firms themselves may not sufficiently appreciate the importance of 
conceptualizing their competitive assets in this way.  Applying this 
analytical framework to law firms therefore may be useful at this point 
mainly as an impetus to begin thinking more systematically about the forms 
of knowledge that firms possess and the concept of innovation in legal 
services. 
The first question is what stock of private knowledge a firm may have.  
With respect to explicit knowledge, sources of law such as statutes, 
regulations, judicial opinions, and the like are publicly available.  Firms 
may vary, however, in the systems they develop for keeping people 
informed of new developments, as well as for organizing, retrieving, 
searching, and analyzing information about legal sources.  They may 
compile special legal databases for particular practice groups and arrange 
for regular briefings for lawyers and other people in the group.  Firms also 
may use distinctive ways of staffing and dividing work among members of 
teams involved in litigation, transactions, legislative work, regulatory 
advice and compliance, and other types of matters.  They may develop 
explicit knowledge in the form of due diligence checklists, standard forms 
that can be modified for particular matters, document review processes, 
conflicts checking systems, client intake procedures, and standard terms in 
engagement letters.  They also may create specific procedures for providing 
feedback and evaluating performance at the end of a representation. 
Firms also possess tacit knowledge in various forms.  People have insight 
into matters such as how to approach negotiations with various parties, how 
to navigate a matter through a regulatory agency, when to use which 
documents in connection with what types of cases or deals, what types of 
arguments are likely to be most effective before which tribunals, the formal 
 152. Matusik & Hill, supra note 130, at 691. 
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and informal networks of influence inside client organizations, how clients 
store and use information, the skills and expertise of various people within 
the firm and in other firms, and the economics and competitive landscape of 
industries in which clients operate. 
These are but a few of the forms of knowledge that law firms possess that 
contribute to organizational effectiveness.  As firms participate more 
extensively in outsourcing, their personnel also may have access to the 
knowledge of suppliers and other partners that comprise a firm’s supply 
chain.  A firm thus will come to possess knowledge beyond what is 
contained within its formal boundaries.  This can make it difficult for 
anyone in the firm to have enough information about the firm’s knowledge 
stock to determine the risks of and opportunities for knowledge transfer in 
relationships with outside agents. 
This difficulty reflects the phenomenon of “distributed knowledge.”  As 
organizations such as firms become larger and more complex, the 
knowledge they possess becomes more “distributed.”  Distributed 
knowledge is knowledge “that is not possessed by any single mind, but 
‘belongs to’ a group of interacting agents, somehow emerges from the 
aggregation of the (possibly tacit) knowledge elements of the individual 
agents, and can be mobilized for productive purposes.”153  A set of agents 
thus knows something that no single agent completely knows.  As a firm 
comes increasingly to rely on knowledge specialists, whether employees or 
outsiders, it can be conceptualized as a “distributed knowledge system.”154
Researchers suggest that this dynamic has accelerated in recent years as 
firms acquire knowledge from an expanding number of disciplines, which 
themselves are becoming more complex in terms of depth and 
specialization.155
Awareness of the increasingly distributed character of knowledge has 
prompted efforts in recent years to implement knowledge management 
programs in law firms.  These programs aim to identify, capture, and 
distribute knowledge that firms possess so that it can be put to productive 
use.156  They enable lawyers in the firm to work more efficiently by 
drawing on the accumulated wisdom and products of others who have been 
involved in similar projects.  They can help a firm respond more quickly to 
client requests, and to market its systems and processes to clients as a 
 153. Kirsten Foss & Nicholai J. Foss, Authority in the Context of Distributed Knowledge
1 (Danish Unit for Indus. Dynamics, Working Paper No. 03-08, 2002), available at
http://www3.druid.dk/wp/20030008.pdf.  Foss and Foss emphasize “that this does not 
amount to asserting the existence of mysterious supra-individual ‘collective minds.’  
Knowledge still ultimately resides in the heads of individuals; however, when this 
knowledge is combined and ‘aggregated’ in certain ways, it means that considered as a 
system, a set of agents possesses knowledge that they do not possess if separated.” Id. at 5. 
 154. Haridimos Tsoukas, The Firm as a Distributed Knowledge System:  A 
Constructionist Approach, 17 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 11, 13 (1996). 
155. See Granstrand et al., supra note 109, at 8. 
 156. GRETTA RUSANOW, KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT AND THE SMARTER LAWYER 7 
(2003).
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competitive advantage of the firm.  Firms also can draw on distributed 
knowledge to develop innovative products for clients, such as online 
advisory services or document assembly programs. 
Many programs that have been established, however, focus on capturing 
explicit knowledge, with an emphasis on legal knowledge, rather than 
tapping into tacit knowledge on a broad range of subjects.157  A crucial 
function of knowledge management, however, is converting tacit 
knowledge into explicit knowledge.158  Accomplishing this task may 
require, for instance, performing an inventory of the matters on which 
people in the firm have worked and the expertise that they have required, 
and then creating a database that lists which people have what experience.  
This should be continually updated as members of the firm work on new 
matters and acquire new expertise.  Some of this knowledge can be 
expressed in explicit terms, while tacit knowledge can be transmitted 
informally if people are aware of whom to contact for insights on what 
issues.  This system can enhance the ability of the firm to draw on the 
knowledge distributed among its members. 
Despite the advantages of more systematic knowledge management 
programs, firms have tended to face some obstacles in implementing them.  
Firms often have discrete rather than integrated financial, document, and 
client management systems; reliance on hourly billing can limit incentives 
for initiatives that can result in work being done more quickly; partner 
compensation models that focus on individual revenue generation can limit 
willingness to share work and expertise; members of practice groups may 
have limited opportunities to interact with lawyers in other groups; and 
lawyers may be concerned that their human capital will become less rare 
and less valuable if they share knowledge widely with others.  Law firms 
will need to overcome these impediments in order to make intelligent 
decisions about the knowledge transfer risks and opportunities they will 
confront in working with outside suppliers. 
Law firms that want to enhance their ability to acquire and integrate 
knowledge from outside workers also may need to deal with employee 
perceptions that such workers have little to teach the firm.  Status hierarchy 
is a prominent feature of the legal profession, and contingent workers 
typically are accorded low status by lawyers and permanent employees 
within law firms.  This may lead firm members to overlook the knowledge 
that contingent workers can offer on subjects such as how to organize and 
review information more efficiently and how to deliver services in 
innovative ways. 
Assuming that firms have adequate knowledge management systems in 
place and are receptive to the possibility of learning from outside workers, 
what type of outsourcing strategy is likely to be attractive to them from the 
standpoint of knowledge transfer?  The main motives for outsourcing to 
157. Id. at 71. 
158. Id. at 119–34. 
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date have been the desire to reduce costs and to adjust the workforce in 
response to fluctuating demand.  In terms of Matusik and Hill’s matrix, 
firms are moving toward the intense end of the spectrum with respect to 
cost and flexibility pressures.  This suggests that they have placed a “high 
value on knowledge preservation,” “low value on knowledge creation,” 
“low value on public knowledge accumulation,” and “high value on direct 
cost saving.”159  As a result, firms have used outside workers mostly for 
support functions, such as handling discovery of electronic information in 
litigation, reviewing documents for relevance and privileged status, 
conducting legal research on discrete legal issues, and reviewing and 
modifying standard transaction documents.   
The other dimension of Matusik and Hill’s matrix is how dynamic a 
firm’s environment is with respect to innovation and the rate at which 
knowledge becomes obsolete.  Law firms’ tendency to use outsourcing for 
support functions suggests that they either believe they operate in an 
environment characterized by low dynamism or that they simply have not 
focused on this dimension.  In either case, the increasing sophistication of 
clients and the growing complexity of transactions and disputes suggest that 
firms may gain a competitive advantage by focusing more explicitly on 
possibilities to use outsourcing to acquire new knowledge that can lead to 
innovation in the services they provide.  Law firms, however, generally 
have not placed a priority on innovation in the way that companies in many 
other sectors have done.  They do not, for instance, have research and 
development programs,160 nor do they typically enter into the kind of joint 
ventures that are common among high technology firms.161
There may be several reasons for this trend.  First, many modern firms 
may not be confident that they will be representing a sufficiently large 
group of similar clients to make investment in innovation worthwhile.  
Firms have a greater incentive to invest in research and development as it 
becomes more likely that they will be able to spread its cost over a large 
number of clients and capture the benefits of innovation.  One of the most 
notable instances of law firm innovation, for instance, was Wachtell 
Lipton’s creation of the poison pill takeover defense in the 1980s.162  While 
the firm developed the first version of a pill in the course of a takeover 
fight, it continued to revise it independent of the needs of any particular 
client.163  In this respect, Wachtell “was developing and refining the new 
legal device much as a manufacturing company might modify a new 
product after an initial market test.”164  The firm could do this because it 
 159. Matusik & Hill, supra note 130, at 690 tbl.1. 
160. See Mitu Gulati & Robert E. Scott, Three and a Half Minutes 65–69 (Oct. 8, 2009) 
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162. See Michael J. Powell, Professional Innovation:  Corporate Lawyers and Private 
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was confident that it would be representing a large number of clients who 
needed help fending off hostile tender offers.  Similarly, Stephen Choi and 
G. Mitu Gulati maintain that Cleary Gottlieb’s representation of the largest 
number of issuers in sovereign bond offerings is an important reason for the 
firm’s willingness to initiate significant shifts in the standard terms of such 
bonds.  “Attorneys handling smaller numbers of offerings,” they suggest, 
“may simply lack the economies of scale to absorb the fixed costs of 
generating a new term, researching the impact of the term, and bearing the 
risk if the term turns out poorly for the clients.”165
Many firms today, however, have no assurance that representing a client 
in a particular matter means that they will do so in similar matters in the 
future.  Even firms that participate in preferred provider networks are 
guaranteed a certain amount of work only for a limited period of two or 
three years.166  This uncertainty may decline if sole source arrangements 
such as those between Tyco and Eversheds and between Levi Strauss and 
Orrick become more common,167 but it is too early to say whether such 
arrangements will spread or whether they will encourage law firm 
investment in innovation. 
Second, law firms enjoy no intellectual property protection for any 
innovations they develop.  A firm that designs a creative deal structure, for 
instance, will lose control over that innovation the moment it distributes 
documents to the parties—and their lawyers—involved in the transaction.  
As soon as Wachtell Lipton developed the poison pill, “several additional 
varieties of the [pill] soon appeared in the marketplace, each hawked by 
different law firms extolling the virtues of their particular model.”168  This 
inability to capture the lion’s share of rewards from innovation may 
discourage law firms from incurring the cost of developing novel 
arrangements. 
Third, law firm financial structure may discourage investment in 
innovation.  Firms distribute their profits to partners at the end of each year.  
Many do not hold back the equivalent of retained earnings for investment in 
the firm, in part because of fear that profitable partners will leave for more 
lucrative options at other firms.  In addition, more attenuated ties between 
partners and firms means that partners may not have the long-term 
perspective that would support investments that might pay off only with 
 165. Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, Innovation in Boilerplate Contracts:  An 
Empirical Examination of Sovereign Bonds, 53 EMORY L.J. 929, 994 (2004). 
 166. On the possible movement toward more durable ongoing relationships between 
corporate clients and selected law firms, see Wilkins, supra note 126. 
167. See Richard Lloyd, In-House Lawyer:  The Power of One, LEGAL WK., May 29, 
2008, http://www.legalweek.com/legal-week/analysis/1168974/in-house-lawyer-the-power; 
Amanda Royal, Orrick-Levi Strauss Deal Underscores Growth of Alternative Billing,
LAW.COM, Nov. 24, 2009, http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1202435773922. 
 168. Powell, supra note 162, at 441 (footnote omitted). 
2180 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 78 
some delay or not at all.169  Partners bear all the risk of such investment, 
since firms are prohibited from having outside investors with diversified 
portfolios who might be willing to take the risk that research and 
development efforts might not yield a return.  In addition, specialists who 
serve as the engine of innovation comprise only one practice group in large 
firms and must compete for resources with other groups.  By contrast, 
Wachtell Lipton was a firm that specialized in takeover defense when it 
developed the poison pill and was able to maintain its competitive 
advantage because it remained a small firm with a focused practice.  A large 
percentage of lawyers in the firm thus likely saw themselves as the 
beneficiaries of continuing efforts to refine the pill. 
Finally, law firms face obstacles to participating in networks that may be 
especially likely to prompt innovation.  Ronald Burt suggests that there is 
particular value in networks in which a party has relationships with diverse 
partners who otherwise have no connection to one another.170  Participation 
in networks with such “structural holes” exposes an actor more quickly to a 
broader range of information and a diversity of perspectives.  This may 
enable a participant to make the connections among disparate conceptual 
schemes that result in innovation.  Despite this potential benefit, high-status 
firms may be wary that developing ties with a wide range of partners across 
status boundaries will dilute their own status.171  In addition, bar rules 
prohibit lawyers from practicing in multidisciplinary organizations, in 
which lawyers might be exposed to diverse perspectives, and in firms in 
which nonlawyers have management or ownership interests.172
Despite these potential limitations, the concept of innovation in legal 
services has begun to receive more sustained attention in recent years.  The 
Financial Times inaugurated an annual Innovative Lawyers Report in 2006, 
which has recognized and spurred alternative approaches to providing legal 
services by European law firms and legal departments.173  The College of 
Law Practice Management sponsors an annual InnovAction Award,174 and 
the American Bar Association has published a booklet on Innovations in the 
Delivery of Legal Services.175  More broadly, the topic of innovation has 
169. See Larry E. Ribstein, The Death of Big Law (Ill. Law & Econ. Research Papers 
Series, Paper No. LE09-025, 2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1467730. 
 170. See generally RONALD S. BURT, STRUCTURAL HOLES: THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF 
COMPETITION (1992). 
 171. PODOLNY, supra note 93, at 231. 
172. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.4 (2009).  For a more extensive 
discussion of how regulation of the legal profession inhibits innovation, see Gillian K. 
Hadfield, Legal Barriers to Innovation:  The Growing Economic Cost of Professional 
Control over Corporate Legal Markets, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1689 (2008). 
173. See, e.g., FINANCIAL TIMES SPECIAL REPORT: FT INNOVATIVE LAWYERS (2009), 
http://www.ft.com/reports/innovativelawyers2009.  The Financial Times plans to launch a 
report on innovation in U.S. law firms in the near future. 
 174. College of Law Practice Management, InnovAction:  About the Awards, 
http://www.innovactionaward.com/abouttheawards.php (last visited Feb. 28, 2010). 
 175. STANDING COMM. ON THE DELIVERY OF LEGAL SERVS., ABA, INNOVATIONS IN THE 
DELIVERY OF LEGAL SERVICES: ALTERNATIVE AND EMERGING MODELS FOR THE PRACTICING
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become a more prominent focus in the legal press176 and the legal 
academy.177  None of this ensures that innovation will occur, of course, but 
increasing attention to what the concept means in legal services enhances 
the likelihood that at least some firms will rethink the way they do business. 
It is difficult to say how intensely innovative an environment in legal 
services might emerge, but to the extent that it does, firms will place a 
higher value on knowledge creation and the accumulation of public 
knowledge.178  Greater research on and attention to the concept of 
innovation could increase firms’ interest in using outside workers as a 
vehicle for acquiring new advanced knowledge that can be used in the 
performance of core functions.  At a minimum, it would help clarify the 
ways in which knowledge is created, sustained, and rendered obsolete in the 
legal services industry. 
D. Use of Contingent Workers
1.  Introduction 
As outsourcing increases in response to pressures to decompose tasks and 
assign them to the most cost-efficient providers, firms use a larger number 
of contingent workers who are not permanent employees to perform a 
variety of functions.  This practice can produce benefits by increasing the 
flexibility of firms in adjusting personnel costs to changes in demand.  
Firms need to be aware, however, that the use of contingent workers can 
produce significant changes throughout an organization: 
Outsourcing changes the nature of tasks, the design of jobs, and the 
design of subunits and interunit relationships, thus changing the 
experience of employment, including the tasks that individuals perform, 
whom individuals interact with when performing their work and the 
nature and frequency of that interaction, and the compensation individuals 
receive for their work.179
Alison Davis-Blake and Joseph Broschak provide a comprehensive 
review of research on the impact of outsourcing on permanent employees, 
LAWYER (2002), available at http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/downloads/delivery/
innovations.pdf. 
176. See, e.g., Adam Smith, Esq., “Innovation in Legal Services” Sponsored by Allen & 
Overy, http://www.adamsmithesq.com/archives/2008/06/innovation-in-legal-servi.html 
(June 3, 2008, 9:47 EST); Andrew Zangrilli, Client Driven Innovations in Legal Services—
The State of the Legal Profession, Part 1, FINDLAW, http://practice.findlaw.com/law-
practice-management-articles/00006/000447.html (last visited Feb. 28, 2010). 
177. See, e.g., Hadfield, supra note 172.  For a fascinating discussion of the possibilities 
for collaborative work on developing contract innovations, see George Triantis, 
Collaborative Contract Collaboration (Nov. 10, 2009) (unpublished article, on file with 
authors) (discussing The Harvard Law School Contracts Wiki, http://ackwiki.com/drupal/
(last visited Feb. 28, 2010)). 
178. See Matusik & Hill, supra note 130, at 690. 
 179. Alison Davis-Blake & Joseph P. Broschak, Outsourcing and the Changing Nature of 
Work, 35 ANN. REV. SOC. 321, 322 (2009). 
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work group dynamics, job design, and organizational structure and 
culture.180  They divide outsourcing into three major types.  The first occurs 
when a firm outsources entire business functions or processes.  Thus, for 
instance, biotechnology companies involved in research may outsource 
functions such as pharmaceutical manufacturing or marketing and 
distribution to firms with skills and expertise in those specialties.  A second 
type of outsourcing involves locating portions of business processes, or 
components of complex products or services, outside the boundaries of the 
firm.  Within the human resource function, for instance, a company may 
outsource the administration of benefits or payroll services while retaining 
other functions inside the firm.  Finally, firms may outsource the staffing 
function, obtaining workers through intermediaries such as temporary 
employment agencies, professional employer organizations, and executive 
search firms.181  In these cases, the firm typically supervises and directs the 
work of individuals who are provided by intermediaries. 
2.  Employee Tasks and Skills 
One body of work to which Davis-Blake and Broschak direct attention is 
research on the impact of outsourcing on permanent employee tasks and 
skills.  This body of work suggests that the impact depends on the types of 
functions that a firm outsources and its reasons for doing so.  Firms may 
seek to outsource support functions while retaining core functions, or may 
assign simpler tasks to contractors in order to reduce the organization’s 
dependency on them.  In these cases, permanent employees can be freed 
from routine tasks and have greater opportunities to focus on more complex 
and challenging work.182  In other cases, firms may outsource for 
specialized skills and expertise that are too expensive, used too 
infrequently, or change too rapidly to justify investment in internal 
capabilities.  This decision may relegate permanent employees to 
performance of relatively routine tasks.183
Outsourcing also may create the need for employees to perform new 
tasks and learn new skills.  Firms that engage in process outsourcing need 
to develop structures to integrate the work of parties whom they do not 
directly supervise.  As the earlier discussion of process integration 
indicates, employees must develop skills in project management.  One 
study of engineering outsourcing, for instance, identified five capabilities 
180. Id.
 181. Id. at 324–25. 
 182. Paul S. Adler, Making the HR Outsourcing Decision, MIT SLOAN MGMT. REV., Fall 
2003, at 53, 55–56; Soon Ang & Sandra A. Slaughter, Work Outcomes and Job Design for 
Contract Versus Permanent Information Systems Professionals on Software Development 
Teams, 25 MIS Q. 321, 323 (2001); Brenda A. Lautsch, Uncovering and Explaining 
Variance in the Features and Outcomes of Contingent Work, 56 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV.
23, 24 (2002). 
183. See G. EDWARD GIBSON, JR., ALISON DAVIS-BLAKE, JOSEPH P. BROSCHAK &
FERNANDO J. RODRIGUEZ, OWNER/CONTRACTOR ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGES: PHASE I
REPORT 32–33 (1998). 
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that firm engineers need beyond technical skills:  (1) writing and managing 
contracts and budgets, (2) communication skills for coordinating and 
cultivating relationships with outsource partners, (3) the ability to motivate 
and engage in change management with outsource partners, (4) skills for 
team-building and delegating responsibilities, and (5) problem-solving 
skills for analyzing options and planning for contingencies.184  The firms in 
which these engineers worked, however, did little to provide formal training 
in these skills.  This research suggests that some firms still fail to appreciate 
that movement of tasks outside the firm to multiple providers requires 
taking steps to integrate activities all along the supply chain. 
Outsourcing that takes the form of staffing through intermediaries also 
may create new tasks for firm employees, although these may be less 
complex and more burdensome than those required by process outsourcing.  
When firms use temporary workers, employees often are required to 
supervise and correct their work.185  “[I]n many lead firms,” Davis-Blake 
and Broschak report, “the responsibility for orientation, training, and 
socialization of outsourced workers regularly falls on the shoulders of the 
lead firm’s employees, who do not receive any additional compensation for 
these efforts.”186  This can make it hard for employees to do their own jobs 
adequately, especially when turnover of temporary workers is high. 
3.  Work Group Dynamics 
Firms also need to be aware that outsourcing can produce changes in the 
composition of work groups and in group processes that have the potential 
to affect relationships among workers.  Most research has focused on the 
use of a “blended workforce,”187 which involves temporary or contract 
workers brought into firms to work with permanent employees.  Research 
on the impact of outsourcing on permanent employee attitudes has focused 
thus far only on staffing through intermediaries.  This scholarship suggests 
that firms need to be aware of certain challenges that this form of 
outsourcing can pose.  One study of an electronics manufacturing plant, for 
instance, found that the use of temporary workers reduced perceived job 
security and fostered resentment among permanent employees at having to 
 184. ALISON DAVIS-BLAKE, KEVIN E. DICKSON, JOSEPH P. BROSCHAK, G. EDWARD 
GIBSON, JR., FERNANDO J. RODRIGUEZ & TODD A. GRAHAM, OWNER/CONTRACTOR 
ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGES: PHASE II REPORT 31–33 (1999) [hereinafter 
OWNER/CONTRACTOR PHASE II REPORT]. 
185. See John Francis Geary, Employment Flexibility and Human Resource Management:  
The Case of Three American Electronics Plants, 6 WORK EMP. & SOC’Y 251, 262–64 (1992); 
Vicki Smith, Institutionalizing Flexibility in a Service Firm:  Multiple Contingencies and 
Hidden Hierarchies, 21 WORK & OCCUPATIONS 284, 298–300 (1994). 
 186. Davis-Blake & Broschak, supra note 179, at 328. 
 187. Susan J. Ashford, Elizabeth George & Ruth Blatt, Old Assumptions, New Work:  The 
Opportunities and Challenges of Research on Nonstandard Employment, 2 ACAD. MGMT.
ANNALS 65 (2007); Alison Davis-Blake, Joseph P. Broschak & Elizabeth George, Happy
Together?  How Using Nonstandard Workers Affects Exit, Voice, and Loyalty Among 
Standard Employees, 46 ACAD. MGMT. J. 475 (2003). 
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work with their temporary colleagues.188  Another study of aerospace 
engineers found that the presence of contract engineers lowered employee 
trust in the organization.189  Still other research has found that the use of 
temporary workers lowered permanent employees’ commitment to the 
organization, reduced their trust in it, and increased perceptions of a 
violation of the psychological contract;190 that it lowered trust toward peers, 
organization-based self-esteem, and altruism;191 and that it increased 
employee turnover.192
Blake-Davis and Broschak note that there is no consensus on why staff 
outsourcing may lead to negative permanent employee attitudes in some 
cases.193  One possible explanation is that the use of temporary workers 
puts subtle pressure on permanent employees to work harder and longer 
than usual because temporary workers do not work overtime and generally 
are not flexible in their assignments.194  Another is that the use of 
outsourced labor serves as a subtle reminder to employees of their 
potentially uncertain job status;195 still another is that employees resent the 
uncompensated responsibilities for training and supervising temporary 
workers that they need to assume.196
Research suggests that the effect of outsourcing on permanent employee 
attitudes may differ according to the status of the outside worker, the 
position of the employee, and the nature of the interaction between outside 
and permanent workers.  One early study found that the use of temporary 
production workers to work alongside permanent employees in an 
electronics manufacturing plant created tension and impaired group 
performance because employees resented the fact that they had to take time 
away from their own jobs to train and supervise temporary workers.197
Another study of a business services firm concluded that temporary workers 
heightened work group conflict for the same reason and because hierarchies 
tend to develop when individuals work together under different 
arrangements.198  Consistent with the latter finding, Davis-Blake and 
Broschak suggest that the negative effects of outsourcing increase with the 
proportion of temporary workers in work groups because temporary 
 188. Geary, supra note 185, at 260–61. 
 189. Jone L. Pearce, Toward an Organizational Behavior of Contract Laborers:  Their 
Psychological Involvement and Effects on Employee Co-workers, 36 ACAD. MGMT. J. 1082, 
1090 (1993).
 190. Elizabeth George, External Solutions and Internal Problems:  The Effects of 
Employment Externalization on Internal Workers’ Attitudes, 14 ORG. SCI. 386, 399 (2003). 
 191. Prithviraj Chattopadhyay & Elizabeth George, Examining the Effects of Work 
Externalization Through the Lens of Social Identity Theory, 86 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 781, 
787 (2001). 
 192. Davis-Blake et al., supra note 187, at 330. 
 193. Davis-Blake & Broschak, supra note 179, at 330. 
194. See Geary, supra note 185, at 260–61; Smith, supra note 185, at 300. 
195. See Davis-Blake & Broschak, supra note 179, at 330; Geary, supra note 185, at 259. 
196. See Davis-Blake et al., supra note 187, at 478. 
197. See Geary, supra note 185, at 259–60. 
198. See Smith, supra note 185, at 300–01. 
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workers tend to have lower social status in such groups than do employees, 
a difference that is reinforced by employers’ efforts to identify and treat the 
two sets of employees differently in order to avoid coemployment 
claims.199
The effect of blending outside workers and employees may differ 
depending on the characteristics of each.  Davis-Blake, Broschak, and 
Elizabeth George, for instance, distinguish between contract workers, who 
sign agreements with organizations to furnish services for a specific length 
of time, and temporary workers, who are hired for indefinite, typically 
shorter, periods of time.200  Contractors are more likely to work 
independently or to receive some supervision from an intermediary staffing 
organization.  The study indicates that using temporary workers in blended 
work groups has a greater negative effect on group dynamics than using 
contract workers, and that this effect increases with the proportion of 
temporary workers.  They suggest that contract workers pose less of a threat 
to the job security of permanent employees because they typically are used 
to provide new knowledge that is complementary to, rather than a substitute 
for, the knowledge of employees.201  Contract workers also generally 
require less supervision from permanent employees than do temporary 
workers.
Research also suggests that workers in lower-wage positions are more 
strongly affected by the use of blended work groups because they are most 
similar to, and most threatened by, the use of temporary workers.202
Employees with formal responsibility for training coworkers are less 
affected than other employees, perhaps because they are not asked 
informally to take on additional duties without compensation.203
The tension that can result from blending temporary and permanent 
employees can prompt closer management supervision in an effort to 
integrate the two types of workers.  This in turn may increase mistrust of 
and resentment toward supervisors of permanent employees.204  Other 
research finds that employees who work with either temporary or contract 
workers report poorer relationships with supervisors,205 and that the 
relationships worsen with higher proportions of temporary workers.206  Two 
scholars suggest that permanent employees hold their supervisors 
199. See Joseph P. Broschak & Alison Davis-Blake, Mixing Standard Work and 
Nonstandard Deals:  The Consequences of Heterogeneity in Employment Arrangements, 49 
ACAD. MGMT. J. 371, 388–89 (2006). 
200. See Davis-Blake et al., supra note 187, at 476. 
201. See id. at 477. 
202. See Broschak & Davis-Blake, supra note 199, at 389; Davis-Blake et al., supra note 
187, at 478. 
203. See Davis-Blake et al., supra note 187, at 476. 
204. See Geary, supra note 185, at 259. 
205. See Davis-Blake et al., supra note 187, at 476. 
206. See Broschak & Davis-Blake, supra note 199, at 389. 
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responsible for fairly allocating work in blended groups and thus may 
blame them for perceived inequities in such groups.207
In sum, the use of contingent workers, particularly through staffing 
outsourcing, can both increase organizational flexibility and pose 
challenges in the workplace.  On one hand, “[s]taffing outsourcing allows 
many lead firm managers to delegate training, evaluating, or monitoring of 
temporary workers to peers and to delegate responsibility for hiring, 
managing, and disciplining temporary workers” to outside 
intermediaries.208  On the other hand, if firms are not careful, this practice 
has the potential to undermine both the effectiveness of work teams and the 
relationships between supervisors and subordinates.  Firms that plan to use 
contingent workers need to consider the potential for such outcomes and 
how to avoid them in order to derive meaningful benefits from outsourcing. 
4.  Organizational Design 
Outsourcing requires that knowledge and information flow across the 
organizational boundaries between a lead firm and its outside providers.  As 
two scholars observe, 
[T]he problem of information flow across boundaries is not simply one of 
determining how to transfer a particular volume and type of information.  
Differences between lead firms and suppliers in culture, norms, and even 
the language in which business is normally conducted can easily lead to 
misperceptions and miscommunications about assumptions, standard 
operating procedures, and even the definition of terms used by the other 
party.209
Responding to this challenge may require changes in both organizational 
structure and culture.  The nature of these changes will depend upon the 
complexity of the work that is outsourced, its volume, whether it is a core 
or peripheral function of the firm, whether entire or partial processes are 
outsourced, and whether design as well as execution of the activity is 
delegated to an outside provider.210
Three researchers have suggested that firms can respond to the need to 
enhance information flow across organizational boundaries in three basic 
ways.211  First, they can use formal governance mechanisms to specify in 
some detail the interaction between firms.  One way to do this is by entering 
into alliances governed by relational contracts with certain suppliers.  These 
alliances represent legal relationships around which firms can create 
organizational structures.  Such relationships are relatively stable; they 
207. See id.
 208. Davis-Blake & Broschak, supra note 179, at 331–32. 
209. Id. at 333. 
210. See id. at 332–35. 
 211. Id. at 332–33. See generally Edward G. Anderson, Jr., Alison Davis-Blake & 
Geoffrey G. Parker, Managing Outsourced Product Design:  The Effectiveness of 
Alternative Integration Mechanisms (Oct. 24, 2008) (unpublished manuscript, on file with 
authors).
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reduce the number of suppliers and allow a firm to focus on 
communications with them.212  A variation on this is to divide suppliers 
into different tiers and focus interactions on one tier, relying on suppliers in 
this tier to manage the activities of providers in other tiers.213
If the costs of establishing and maintaining alliances or supplier tiers are 
too high, a firm may attempt to maximize information flow by relying on 
less formal mechanisms.  One is colocation—assigning personnel from one 
organization to work in another.  Another is using “boundary spanners” 
whose main responsibility is to enhance the exchange of information 
between a lead firm and its suppliers.214  These measures can create 
personal relationships that foster trust, align expectations, and enable the 
transmission of tacit or sensitive information.215
Outsourcing may have an impact not only on organizational structure but 
also on organizational culture.  As Davis-Blake and Broschak observe, 
“[b]ecause outsourcing changes which individuals interact regularly with 
each other, the frequency of those interactions, and the issues about which 
they interact, outsourcing has the potential to materially change 
organizational culture.”216  Research on this subject currently is relatively 
limited.  One body of scholarship indicates that contract and temporary 
workers are less likely than employees to identify with and be committed to 
the lead firm.217  One study, however, focused on the extent to which 
contract workers identify with both the lead firm and the intermediary.218  It 
found that identification with the lead firm can be strengthened by social 
ties between contract and permanent employees, while identification with 
the intermediary tended to be a function of that organization’s 
distinctiveness in the marketplace.219  Since individuals will shape and 
disseminate an organization’s culture the more they identify with it, 
promoting strong social ties between contract and permanent employees 
may help develop a common culture.  Exactly what the elements of that 
common culture are likely to be, however, and the extent to which it 
212. See Ranjay Gulati, Does Familiarity Breed Trust?  The Implications of Repeated 
Ties for Contractual Choice in Alliances, 38 ACAD. MGMT. J. 85, 106–09 (1995). 
213. See Kim B. Clark, Project Scope and Project Performance:  The Effect of Parts 
Strategy and Supplier Involvement on Product Development, 35 MGMT. SCI. 1247, 1252 n.14 
(1989).
214. See Lori Rosenkopf & Atul Nerkar, Beyond Local Search:  Boundary-Spanning, 
Exploration, and Impact in the Optical Disk Industry, 22 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 287, 290 
(2001).
215. See Brian Uzzi, Social Structure and Competition in Interfirm Networks:  The 
Paradox of Embeddedness, 42 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 35, 59 (1997). 
 216. Davis-Blake & Broschak, supra note 179, at 334. 
217. See, e.g., Judi McLean Parks, Deborah L. Kidder & Daniel G. Gallagher, Fitting 
Square Pegs into Round Holes:  Mapping the Domain of Contingent Work Arrangements 
onto the Psychological Contract, 19 J. ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. 697 (1998); Linn Van Dyne 
& Soon Ang, Organizational Citizenship Behavior of Contingent Workers in Singapore, 41 
ACAD. MGMT. J. 692 (1998). 
218. See generally Elizabeth George & Prithviraj Chattopadhyay, One Foot in Each 
Camp:  The Dual Identification of Contract Workers, 50 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 68 (2005). 
219. Id. at 93–95. 
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reinforces or undermines the lead firm’s objectives, remain a subject for 
future research. 
Research on outsourcing the human resources function also may have 
implications for organizational culture.  Lead firms and staffing 
intermediaries in many cases are moving away from spot market 
transactions toward more complex interdependent relationships in which 
the intermediary attempts to learn the nuances of the lead firm’s culture and 
provide it with employees that are a good fit.220  Intermediaries whose 
personnel work on the lead firm’s site may be especially likely to “become 
involved with complex, often unstated negotiations with lead firm managers 
about what the culture of the lead firm should be and about the attributes 
required to fit in the culture of the lead firm.”221
Davis-Blake and Broschak conclude that future research should attempt 
to clarify the impacts of outsourcing on organizational structure and culture.  
They suggest that one potentially significant issue is whether firms that 
begin to rely on outsourcing continue to do so or vacillate between 
outsourcing and internal production in order to avoid some of the negative 
impacts of relying on outside providers.  For firms that follow the first path, 
outsourcing may result in relatively permanent changes in organizational 
features.  For firms that pursue the second path, effects on structure and 
culture may be more ephemeral.222
5.  Law Firms 
Assessing the potential impact of outsourcing on work relationships 
involving law firm projects requires first considering what type of 
arrangements law firms tend to use.  Do most firms outsource entire 
processes, partial processes, or the staffing function to obtain temporary 
employees?  We need much better data to answer this question with any 
confidence, but we can suggest at least the broad outlines of what law firms 
seem to do.  Some firms use outside vendors to manage functions such as 
litigation discovery or patent filing, which arguably constitutes locating 
entire processes outside the firm.  The boundary between entire and partial 
processes is not airtight.  Discovery, for instance, obviously is part of the 
larger litigation function, and it needs to be integrated with other activities.  
Nonetheless, it is a relatively discrete aspect of a case that can be segregated 
to some extent.  Firms also assign portions of larger tasks to legal process 
outsourcers, such as the document review function of discovery, legal 
research to inform the provision of a variety of legal services, and the due 
diligence portion of transactional or regulatory work.  In these instances of 
entire or partial process outsourcing, much of the work seems to be done off 
site and tends to be supervised most directly by the contractor. 
220. See, e.g., VICKI SMITH & ESTHER B. NEUWIRTH, THE GOOD TEMP (2008); Davis-
Blake & Broschak, supra note 179. 
 221. Davis-Blake & Broschak, supra note 179, at 335. 
222. See id. at 336. 
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While some firms do engage in outsourcing of entire or partial processes, 
a large percentage of firms appear to use contract lawyers hired through 
staffing intermediaries.  These lawyers are on temporary assignment, but 
may work as long as two or three years on a specific matter, particularly in 
litigation.  They tend to be supervised mostly by people within the firm, 
rather than by outside parties.  A good number probably do work, such as 
document review, that at least some other firms delegate to legal process 
outsourcing companies.  Firms may prefer to use contract lawyers for such 
tasks because of concern about the quality of LPO work, the desire to staff 
sensitive matters so as to ensure supervision by members of the firm, or 
simply because a firm has not evaluated the extent to which portions of its 
work could be outsourced to LPOs. 
Whatever the form that outsourcing takes, law firms appear 
overwhelmingly to use it for what are regarded as routine support functions.  
This tendency may free up lawyers within the firm to do more complex, 
sophisticated work.  Contract lawyers or LPO employees, for instance, may 
conduct large-scale document review that a few years ago was performed 
by associates.  Thus, while there may be fewer associate positions in law 
firms if outsourcing continues to gain momentum, those that remain may be 
offered more challenging work. 
Davis-Blake and Broschak’s review of research suggests that members of 
law firms that engage in process outsourcing will need to develop skills to 
coordinate the work of companies whose work the firm does not supervise 
on a daily basis.  They will need, for instance, good communications skills, 
along with the ability to motivate workers from different organizations, 
negotiate and administer service contracts, assemble effective teams, and 
plan for and respond to contingencies.  Davis-Blake and Broschak found in 
one study that engineering firms generally did not provide much training in 
such skills,223 and it is unlikely that law firms currently do either.  Members 
of firms for the most part probably are building these capabilities through 
trial and error, but an increase in the use of process outsourcing will require 
that law firms provide more systematic training in these functions. 
In contrast to employees of process outsourcing companies, contract 
lawyers tend to be directly supervised by law firms.  This can create extra 
burdens for law firm lawyers—often associates—who are responsible for 
training, monitoring, and correcting the work of these temporary workers.  
The need to oversee this routine work may reduce the time that lawyers are 
able to devote to the more complex work that outsourcing theoretically 
frees them up to perform.  This may create some resentment of both 
contract lawyers and the firm, especially if lawyers are not given credit for 
assuming this supervisory responsibility.  It is less clear whether the use of 
contract lawyers is likely to generate negative attitudes because it heightens 
lawyers’ sense of job insecurity.  Contract lawyers may serve as a reminder 
that some portion of the work done in law firms does not require complex 
 223. OWNER/CONTRACTOR PHASE II REPORT, supra note 184, at 32. 
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analytical skills and that the percentage of such work may increase as even 
sophisticated tasks are broken down into simpler discrete components that 
involve following standard routines that require minimal discretion.  This 
reminder may be especially salient for associates. 
Given the relatively small number of parties in the current law firm 
supply chain, firms may not need to devise substantially different structures 
to ensure adequate information flow between themselves and outside 
suppliers.  To the extent that the size of the chain and number of 
participants increases, they may begin to follow their clients’ practice of 
assembling preferred provider networks.  This would not only enhance the 
flow of information but also could help address the risk of a more 
fragmented workforce comprised of people inside and outside the firm with 
affiliations to different organizations.  Law firms already face major 
challenges in sustaining integrated cultures for a variety of reasons, and 
greater reliance on a network of outside suppliers could exacerbate them. 
More detailed empirical research on law firm use of contingent workers 
would help in analyzing the issues that scholarship on other organizations 
suggests arises with this type of employment relationship.  It would be 
helpful to know more about when law firms use contingent workers, for 
what kinds of tasks, who supervises them, and how using them affects the 
work that lawyers in the firm do. 
CONCLUSION
The Rio Tinto contract with CPA Global suggests that law firms are 
likely to face increasing pressure to disaggregate their services and engage 
in at least some outsourcing to compete effectively in the legal services 
market.  Disaggregation will require greater attention to how work can be 
decomposed, with the goal of selecting the optimal mix of personnel and 
technology to provide service on various matters.  This process may result 
in an increase in the types of positions available for permanent salaried 
lawyers in law firms who have specialized skills in discrete functions or 
areas of law.  It also may increase the use of workers outside the boundaries 
of the firm.  Much of the work that firms assign to both groups is likely to 
be relatively routine or at least limited in scope. 
As a result, the number of associate positions available in law firms each 
year may decline from previous years as outside workers take on these 
tasks.  At the same time, the responsibilities that this smaller group of 
associates assumes may be more challenging than they traditionally have 
been.  This raises two questions.  First, to what extent does complex legal 
work require familiarity with more routine tasks such as reviewing 
documents for relevance or privilege, summarizing depositions, or 
conducting searches on research databases?  If sophisticated work requires 
experience with routine tasks, how will associates acquire such experience 
if clients will pay only for contract lawyers or LPOs to do routine work? 
Second, will firms acknowledge that acquiring complex skills will 
require some period of time in which associates generate only minimal 
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revenues while they are being trained?  This may mean that the type of 
apprenticeship programs that some firms recently have announced may 
become more common.224  Those programs will require a substantial 
commitment by the firm to training and development and by its partners to 
devote time to mentoring.  Will such commitment be forthcoming?  If firms 
begin to hire smaller entering associate classes, it may be advisable to spend 
more time screening candidates and investing in those who are selected, 
rather than using only superficial hiring criteria and relying on competition 
among lawyers who join the firm to identify those who have a future with 
it.  Will firms be willing to do this? 
What legal career paths will be available in this emerging world?  It may 
be that a smaller number of law school graduates realistically will be able to 
aspire to tenure-track associate positions that pay anything like the salaries 
that beginning lawyers have enjoyed in recent years.  Other graduates, 
however, could have opportunities to join firms as permanent lawyers at a 
comfortable but not exceptionally high salary, focusing on work that is 
somewhat specialized and narrower than work available to tenure-track 
associates.  More modest average salaries may put pressure on law schools 
to limit tuition increases, since the financial return on a law school 
education may be smaller for many graduates than it has been in recent 
years.  Schools also will need to think carefully about what kinds of legal 
and nonlegal capabilities their graduates will need if career opportunities 
change in this way. 
On a more general level, the continuing advance of disaggregation would 
create even more ambiguity about what skills distinguish lawyers from 
other occupations.  Performance of an increasing number of activities in the 
legal services supply chain by nonlawyers would begin to shrink the 
territory that lawyers can claim as their own.  If lawyers attempt to define 
that territory as the ability to render sophisticated advice requiring complex 
judgment about corporate affairs, other professionals are in a position to 
claim that they possess the same set of skills. 
The economic downturn therefore could mark a moment of transition for 
law firms less because of its immediate financial impact and more because 
it has highlighted and accelerated the trend toward the disaggregation of 
legal services that had begun before it.  This trend reflects the maturation of 
the legal services sector into a highly competitive industry driven more 
forcefully than ever by pressures for efficiency.  How law firms, clients, 
and organizations connected with this industry respond could shape not 
only the future of law firms, but of the legal profession itself. 
224. See Jeff Jeffrey, For Some Firms, An Extra Step for the Newest Recruits, NAT’L L.J., 
June 29, 2009, at 1.  
